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SINCE AQUINO: THE PHILIPPINE TANGLE AND THE
UNITED STATES
Justus M van der Kroef

"We can't get to where we want to until we spell out where we
want to go-and the Cory regime hasn't furnished any of us with a
road map," one leading Manila newspaper columnist complained in
his assessment of Philippine President Corazon ("Cory") Aquino's
first three months in office. 1 The criticism is not altogether fair. Since
her sudden accession on February 25, 1986, as her nation's ninth President, Mrs. Aquino, a novice in the rough and tumble of Philippine
politics, has shown surprising adroitness, moderation and courage in
facing a host of daunting national problems, not least among them
sharp public division and uncertainty over her country's future relationship with its erstwhile colonial mentor and oldest ally, the United
States. By early 1987 her political survival seemed even more
remarkable.
For Washington, the Philippines' course under Aquino and beyond hardly can be a matter of minor importance. Already in early
March, 1986 a U.S. Defense Department study, details of which remain classified, estimated that (if it came to that) relocation of such
U.S. military facilities in Luzon as the Clark Air Base and the Subic
Bay Naval Station, to such nearby locations as Tinian or Guam,
would cost at least $8 billion. 2 As is known, the Clark and Subic
leases expire in 1991, and while Mrs. Aquino has vowed that she will
not disturb the lease arrangement until then, there is sharp controversy in her government and in Philippine society generally over any
lease renewal, for reasons to be discussed below. Mqreover, not just
Subic and Clark are likely to be involved. There are 11 other military
installations in the country-Cubi Point in La Union province, the
Mactan Air Base in Cebu City and the U.S. Navy relay point in San
Miguel, Tarlac province are a few-where the United States maintains
sophisticated communications facilities. 3
Important U.S. security and economic interests need to be re1. Maximo V. Soliven in Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 7, 1986, p. 5.
2. The Straits Times (Singapore), March 5, 1986, p. 6. See also William H. Sullivan,
"Relocating Bases in the Philippines," Washington Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1984),
pp. 114-119.
3. Midday (Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 6.
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solved in the Philippines' faction-ridden, Communist-endangered and
poverty-stricken society. For Mrs. Aquino and/or her immediate successors, Philippine national problems fall into four major categories:
(1) constitutional legitimacy; (2) the achievement of some stability
with various contending power structures, among them political factions, the Catholic Church, the Army, the Communists and other
armed dissidents and "private armies;" (3) a basis for long-term economic growth amidst an exploding population; and, (4) the nation's
strategic and foreign policy priorities.

I.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE AQUINO GOVERNMENT

As for constitutional legitimacy, the political fait accompli of the
February 1986 change of power tended to be confused with the rule of
law. To be sure, there was from the start little question of Mrs. Ac, quina's considerable personal popularity, particularly among many of
Metropolitan Manila's 7 million inhabitants. But the degree of that
popularity in practical political terms, before as well as after the February 2, 1987 plebiscite on the new Aquino-initiated Philippine constitution, always has been more difficult to gauge. By the end of 1986,
leading U.S. news media had hailed Mrs. Aquino's rise to power as a
major event of that year. But to many Filipinos, her government thus
far not only had brought little real change in living conditions and
employment opportunities, but also had shown on occasion dangerous
political weaknesses that were perceived-however unfairly-as comparing unfavorably with the regime of her predecessor. 4
To the residue of Marcos loyalists and others, Mrs. Aquino's poularity, not to speak of the legitimacy of her Presidential position, are
seriously undercut by three factors: (a) the questionable circumstances surrounding her "revolutionary" accession to power; (b) her
attempt to revamp the local government structure by postponing
scheduled local elections and by the summary dismissal of duly elected
and/or appointed officials and their replacement by pro-Aquino "officers in charge;" and, (c) Mrs. Aquino's position under the new Constitution ultimately accepted by the country.
It is difficult to shake the impression that the initial acceptance of
Mrs. Aquino and her regime was prompted at least to some degree by
the growing aversion at home and abroad to the malversations of her
predecessor. Widespread fraud and voter intimidation attended the
"snap" Presidential election of February 7, 1986, called by then Presi4. Report from Manila by Lewis M. Simons, Knight-News-Tribuen news service, December 26, 1986.
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dent Ferdinand Marcos almost as an act of bravura during an interview on the "This Week with David Brinkley" U.S. television news
program on November 3, 1985. However, for several years prior to
that election, Marcos had been subjected to a campaign of relentless
criticism, particularly in the U.S. media. The criticism centered on
serious allegations of human rights abuses by his regime, incompetence in meeting a growing Communist insurgency and economic
mismanagement. Following the assassination of Philippine opposition
leader Benigno Aquino on the tarmac of Manila International Airport
on August 21, 1983-an assassination the responsibility for which
reached to Marcos' closest advisers-the criticism sharply
accelerated. 5
Already in November 1984, a confidential U.S. National Security
Council analysis had discussed the need for a "well orchestrated policy
of incentives and disincentives" designed to bring about a "peaceful
and eventual transition to a successor government" to that of Marcos. 6
In April 1985, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger expressed
increasing concern about the deteriorating economic and security situation in the Philippines. By early October 1985, according to Representative Don McCurdy (D-Okla.), a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives' Intelligence Committee, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency predicted a "catastrophe" for the Philippines to the House Intelligence and the House Armed Services
Committees if Marcos remained in office and reforms were not carried
out. 7 Later that same month, after a visit to Marcos by Senator Paul
Laxalt (R-Nev.) to indicate president Ronald Reagan's concern, officials from the U.S. State and Defense Departments testified before the
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Marcos' unwillingness
to "clean up" his political system, improve the military's efficiency and
break up his crony-ridden business monopolies could lead to a collapse
in the Philippines. The same sources warned that current trends, including allegedly mounting anti-Marcos sentiment and public disaffection with existing political processes, could lead to a military stalemate
5. For some of these criticisms see, e.g., David Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial
Law in the Philippines, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979; Walden Bello, eta/., Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines, San Francisco: Institute for Food and
Development Policy, 1982; and Belinda A. Aquino, "The Human Rights Situation in the
Philippines," Journal of Asian-Pacific and World Perspectives, vol. 6, no. 2 (Winter 198283), pp. 23-30.
6. Don Oberdorfer reported this in The Washington Post, February 24, 1986, p. 1, col.
4.

7. The Straits Times, April 6, 1985, p. 34 and October 10, 1985, p. 8.
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with the Communist insurgents in as few as three years. 8
Whether Philippine conditions were indeed as serious as these
U.S. government representations made them out to be is arguable.
Moreover, if these conditions were accurately portrayed, whether
there was a clear official understanding of a realistic feasibility of democratic alternatives--certainly of a relatively enduring nature-to the
Marcos regime seems equally open to debate. In any case, to some the
Philippine doomsday scenario seemed premature. For example, a
Communist call to boycott the May 1984 elections for the Batasang
Pambansa (National Assembly) "failed miserably as throngs of Filipinos voted in a resounding endorsement of the electoral process," and
by the close of 1985, the Marcos Government appeared to be showing
sufficient political will to deal with its economic problems so that, according to one authoritative survey, "the country's economy may be
on the road to recovery by 1986." 9 Even a senior U.S. Senate Department official, after ticking off the Philippines' political and economic
problems in early December 1985, conceded that "much of the reporting" about the country tended to be "apocalyptic." 10
Still, the avalanche of criticism undoubtedly helped to persuade
Marcos on November 3, 1985 to call his "snap" Presidential poll (having been reelected for a six-year term in 1981 Marcos need not have
run again until 1987). According to Laxalt, the idea of calling such an
early election had been suggested to Marcos by CIA Director William
Casey, but there has been no confirmation of this. 11 In any event,
Marcos appeared confident, probably in view of the fact that past elections and constitutional plebescites during his tenure had demonstrated to him that he retained control over key local officials and over
the electoral process generally. However, precisely because this control was well understood by his opponents and their foreign supporters, the February 7, 1986, Presidential election was subjected to an
unprecedented degree of foreign and domestic press coverage, and to
8. The New York Times, October 31, 1985, p. I, col. 3.
9. Asia 1985 Yearbook (Hongkong, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1985), p. 228, and
Asia 1986 Yearbook (Hongkong, Far Eastern Economic Review, 1985), p. 225. For a view
more sympathetic to Marcos, see also A. James Gregor, Crisis in the Philippines: A Threat
to U.S. Interests (Washington Ethics and Public Policy Center: Georgetown University,
1984).
10. U.S. Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Michael H. Armacost, "The U.S. and
the Philippines: Dangers and Opportunities," Current Policy (Washington: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), no. 774, (December 5, 1985), p. 3.
II. Paul Laxalt, "My Conversations With Ferdinand Marcos," Policy Review, (Summer !986), pp. 2-5.
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the scrutiny of a visiting team of official U.S. election observers headed
by Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.).
Then, too, Marcos' opponents, though some were at least in theory outside the formal Philippine political process, mounted a major
effort to bring him down. For example, it had been difficult for the
various, splintered, anti-Marcos political forces even to agree on a single opposition slate. The leading United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and its president, Salvador Laurel, at first
proved unwilling to take second place, on a common opposition ticket,
to Mrs. Corazon Aquino. Mrs. Aquino had emerged as the Presidential candidate of the much smaller Lakas ng Bayan (Laban for short)
or "People's Power Movement." Only the direct intervention of Jaime
Cardinal Sin, Primate of the Philippine Roman Catholic Church, to
which some 85 percent of all Filipinos belong, had managed to bring
about a unified opposition ticket, in which Mrs. Aquino ran for the
Presidential slot under the Unido banner. Salvador Laurel was named
as her Vice Presidential running mate.
Moreover, just as Marcos had his lobbyists in the United States,
so in the weeks before the election Mrs. Aquino acquired influential
U.S. Congressional support, as well as the services of U.S. legal and
consulting firms. As one Aquino lobbyist in Washington put it, it was
well understood in his camp that the "court of world opinion" would
be decisive in determining the election outcome. 12 It was in that
"court of world opinion" that Marcos ultimately lost the gamble of his
"snap" Presidential election. There is no doubt that, according to
then prevailing Philippine Constitutional processes, he had won the
election. On February 15, 1986, the 200-member Batasang Pambansa,
over the vain protests of anti-Marcos members, officially tabulated the
election returns and certified Marcos as the winner by some 1.5 million votes. 13 But internationally reported and persuasive evidence of
widespread fraud and voter intimidation almost at once robbed
Marcos of his claim to victory and constitutional legitimacy.
Though legal machinery for an investigation of such election irregularities existed, Mrs. Aquino, probably doubting the fairness of
her chances in such a process, chose not to use the verification process.
Meanwhile, international media focused their attention on the fraudulent vote count of the Marcos government's Comelec (Commission on
Elections), and on vote buying, ballot box stuffing and voter intimida12. The New York Times, March 13, 1986, p. AS, col. I.
13. Maharlika Broadcasting System news report, Quezon City, February 15, 1986, in
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service Reports (hereafter FBIS), February 18, 1986, p.
P2.
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tion by pro-Marcos "goon" squads. Later the foreign press was to
congratulate itself for having "helped to dump a despot" by exposing
these election malversations. 14 In contrast, the supposedly "honest
mistakes" in the vote count admitted by the pro-Aquino Namfrel (National Movement for Free Elections), and the charges by Philippine
officials that there were serious elections violations by Namfrel representatives and "gun-toting Namfrel men" harassing voters, went virtually unreported in the U.S. and foreign press. 15
There were other anomalies. The final Namfrel vote count, issued on February 25, 1986, in which Aquino was declared the winner
by more than 782,000 votes, widely was regarded abroad as authoritative. This occurred even though Namfrel itself admitted in its final
report that its data had come from only 70 percent of the country's
voter turnout and that it could not vouch for the remaining 30
percentfl 6
The curiously one-sided media coverage and the failure to investigate charges of vote fraud by partisans of both camps in the election
did much to tarnish Marcos' image further in the United States. It
also emboldened the opposition against Marcos even after the
Batasang Pambansa on February 15, 1986 formally certified him as
the election winner. On June 11, 1986, the U.S. team headed by Senator Richard Lugar that had observed the election reported that Mrs.
Aquino had won a majority of the votes. Lugar also said that the
Namfrel count "stands as the only reliable indicator" of the Philippine
voter preference. 17 While Lugar's statement may well be true, absent
a thorough and impartial investigation into the allegations of fraud on
both sides, it is difficult to see the basis of the observer team's
conclusion.
The issue is not academic. It was not the "fairness" of the Namfrel count, nor a widespread perception (whether justified or not) of
the inherent legitimacy of the election victory that on February 25
14. David H. Bain, "Letter from Manila-How the Press Helped to Dump a Despot,"
Columbia Journalism Review, (May-June 1986), pp. 27-36.
15. For details and sources see Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Philippines of Aquino:
the Long Morning After," World Affairs (Washington), vol. 148, no. 3, (Winter 1985-86),
pp. 139-150.
16. Business Day (Manila), February 25, 1968, p. 18. See also FBIS, February 27,
1986, p. P14.
17. Philippines Daily Express (Manila), June 12, 1986, p. 2. See also Report to the President of the United States of America on the February 7, 1986 Presidential Election in the
Philippines Submitted by the United States Observer Delegation. Prepared by the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate and The Center for Democracy, Boston University:
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1986.
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catapulted Mrs. Aquino into the Presidency. Rather, it was the military crisis between Marcos and his long-term ally, Defense Minister
Juan Ponce Enrile, who reportedly has been entertaining presidential
aspirations for some time (though currently he disclaims such ambitions).18 Whether Enrile, as Marcos contends, saw his chance and decided to overthrow Marcos as the clamor, especially abroad, began to
mount in the aftermath of the tainted February 7 Presidential election,
or whether Marcos, perhaps suspecting a coup, preemptively decided
to strike against his Defense Minister first, will not be known for some
time. But in the ensuing power play between Enrile and Marcos,
which ended, it will be recalled, with the President leaving the country
after a seemingly unwinnable and bloodless stalemate, Mrs. Aquino
appears to have figured only marginally.
Subsequently, Enrile revealed that, during his defiance of Marcos
in the tense days of February 22-25, 1986, his support for Corazon
Aquino was only his (Enrile's) third option. He initially preferred establishing a "revolutionary council" or, secondly, some sort of "people's committee," involving prominent personalities, among them
clergy and labor leaders. He abandoned these ideas after consulting,
during his confrontation with Marcos, with his (Emile's) ally, then
Philippine Constabulary Chief, and presently Armed Forces Commander, General Fidel Ramos. It became apparent to him, Enrile
said, that it might not seem wise for "ourselves in the military organization" to be seen establishing a "people's committee." 19 Instead, it
was decided to take what one Enrile supporter later called the "complete civilian route." Thus, contact with an agreement to forge a government headed by Aquino and Laurel was made-provided Enrile
retained his position as Secretary of Defense. The latter condition was
accepted by Aquino with some reluctance, considering Enrile's status
as a longtime Marcos "crony."
To be sure, a major turn in the rebellion against Marcos was the
gathering of thousands of Manilans, who, mobilized by their clergy,
labor, and student leaders, interposed themselves as a human wall on
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (commonly called "EDSA") between
Marcos' tanks and Enrile's and Ramos' rebel headquarters at Camp
Crame. In the end, though, it was not the "miracle on EDSA" ( as
many Manilans now dub this episode) but Enrile's defiance, backed by
his own crack military units at Crame, and the entreaties of U.S. offi18. Asiaweek (Hongkong), July 13, 1986, pp. 10-15; The Economist (London), July 12,
1986, p. 30.
19. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, May 9, 1986, in FBIS, May 9, 1986, p. P4.
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cials who urged Marcos to avoid a bloody confrontation, that forced
the President to back down. Enrile and Ramos, calculating the alignment of forces at play, were shrewd enough, at the time, to accept
(and, perhaps in Enrile's case, also make use of) Mrs. Aquino's undoubted personal popularity as symbol of a widely desired, fresh political beginning for the Philippines. However, all this is not the same as
saying that Mrs. Aquino, as a result of the February 7 elections, or
even because of the "miracle on EDSA," necessarily had acquired a
personal constitutional mandate to be President.
That Mrs. Aquino nevertheless acquired the aura of such a mandate was the result of a widespread public sense of relief that bloody
chaos had been avoided, and also of a realization, both in the Philippines and abroad, especially in the United States, that the practical
exigencies of government and international relations demanded at
least some sort of government in the Philippines. Much of the Philippine judiciary readily recognized this reality, thus further legitimizing
Aquino. For example, in adjudicating one lawsuit seeking clarification
of Marcos' claim to the Presidency, a new, Aquino-appointed Philippine Supreme Court ruled in mid-October 1986, that Mrs. Aquino was
the legitimate Philippine President "as reflected in the collective judgement" of the Filipino people and by virtue of "recognition" of her
regime by other nations. 20 Just how that Filipino "collective judgment" could be reconciled with the Philippine constitution at the time
of the February 7, 1986 Presidential election, and with the decision of
the Batasang Pambansa of February 15, 1986 ruling on that election,
was not revealed by this Supreme Court judgment. The Court apparently also chose to sidestep the question of whether international recognition of a particular national regime necessarily overrides any
question of its legitimacy under that nation's own municipal law, or by
what process that law had been properly superseded.
There were other aspects of U.S. policy toward Marcos and the
February 7, 1986 Presidential election that had a troubling effect on
Mrs. Aquino's new position. Philippine elections, whether national or
local, and whether before or after Marcos' imposition of martial law in
1972, have a long history of fraud and violence. 21 One may laud the
U.S. government's decision-for the first time in Philippine historyto observe Marcos' "snap" election of February 7, 1986. Having
goaded Marcos into calling the election and testing his legitimacy by a
20. The New York Times, October 27, 1986, p. 3, col. I.
21. M. Aurora Carboneli-Catilo, J.H. De Leon, and Eleanor E. Nicolas, Manipulated
Elections (College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, Quezon City,
1986).
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constant and unprecedented stream of official Cassandra-like warnings
and criticism of his regime (a process further encouraged perhaps by
CIA director Casey's suggestion), the United States now had the added opportunity to discredit Marcos further.
For anyone familiar with the Filipino political power structure
and the functioning of the well-oiled political machine Marcos had
built since coming to office in 1965, it is difficult to believe that election
malversations rivalling anything the old city boss politics in the United
States could reveal, would not now be rediscovered in the Philippines
in the election of February 7, 1986. Was the decision to send a U.S.
observer team part of that "well orchestrated policy of incentives and
disincentives" to bring Marcos down, as outlined by a previously cited
National Security Council analysis issued more than a year earlier?
One may only speculate as to the answer at this point. The subsequent U.S. denunciations of the February 7 election fraud, however,
have a rather hollow ring, as discussed above. The most recent general elections in the Philippines that were held before the Presidential
poll of February 7, 1986 took place on May 14, 1984. These were the
elections for the Batasang Pambansa, the country's unicameral national legislature. There was extensive partisan campaigning in this
1984 election. Even so, few observers doubted that Marcos' "New
Society Movement" or Kilusan Bagong Lipunan-KBL) would win a
resounding victory, in view of the President's effective hold on his nation's local government elite and bureaucracy. And yet, parties in opposition to the KBL won 61 of the 183 seats in this 1984 Batasang
election, a significant increase from the 16 seats they had held in the
previous legislature. Moreover, principal KBL leaders and Marcos
confidants, including four cabinet ministers, lost their seats. Jaime
Cardinal Sin, a frequent Marcos critic, characterized these May 1984
elections "as the cleanest and most honest since martial law" had been
imposed in 1972, and indeed "among the best since World War II."
Nevertheless there had been fraud and extensive KBL bribery of voters, although "many people took the money and T -shirts offered but
voted to a large extent as they wished." 22
Against such a background, characterizations of the relative
"honesty" or fraudulence of the 1984 Batasang, or of any other Filipino elections for that matter, become suspect. Of course, the country's own political culture and standards must be considered. One
22. Herbert S. Malin, "The Philippines in 1984. Grappling with Crisis," Asian Survey,
February, 1985, pp. 198-205, and Asia Yearbook 1985 (Far Eastern Economic Review,
Hongkong, 1985), p. 228.
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example may illustrate the point. On February 19, 1986, well after
furtious criticism at home and abroad had erupted over the fraud perpetrated during the Marcos-Aquino Presidential election twelve days
earlier, a spokesman for the Philippine Constabulary, the national police, attempted to put matters in context. He declared that, according
to official tabulations, 130 persons had been killed in election-related
violence during the 1984 Batasang elections. In the internationally
more publicized and controversial February 7, 1986 Marcos-Aquino
Presidential contest, however, "only" 91 such deaths had been
counted: 43 of them of KBL supporters, 24 followers of Aquino, and
the others of undetermined political affiliation. 23 General Fidel Ramos, Enrile's ally in the anti-Marcos rebellion of February 22-25, who
subsequently was appointed Philippine Armed Forces Chief by president Aquino, had sounded a similar note on February 4, 1986, just
three days before the Presidential poll. Ramos said that there were
"far fewer" deaths during the 1986 Marcos-Aquino Presidential campaign than in 1984, when the "unofficial" count of election-related
deaths had reached 2,000. 24
Could there have been as many as 2,000 violent deaths (not to
speak of other malversations) during the 1984 Batasang elections?
There were no criticisms in the U.S. or other foreign press about these
1984 Philippine elections, nor does one recall alarmed voices being
raised in the U.S. administration or Congress. Was the February 7,
1986 Presidential election relatively "cleaner" and even more "honest" than the Batasang election of 1984? One could hesitate to say so,
even if some common agreement on a yardstick to make such judgments could be found. But what, then, is the justification for questioning the certification on February 16, 1986 by that same 1984 elected
Batasang that Ferdinand Marcos was the duly reelected President of
the Philippines?
To focus on ballot fraud, voter intimidation and violence in the
February 7, 1986 Philippine Presidential election in order to "delegitimize" Marcos, when such malversations have characterized all
Philippino national elections to date, is to raise the disquieting spectre
of having to delegitimize all previously elected Philippine Presidents.
Whether, henceforth, the United States should or should not feel obligated to send election observer teams and officially pronounce on the
winner in future Philippine polls is difficult to answer. To add to all
23. Agence France Presse desptach, Manila, March 4, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986,
p. Pl.
24. Agence France Presse despatch, February 4, 1986, in FBIS, February 4, 1986, p.
PIS.
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this a "legitimization" of Mrs. Aquino on the basis of the dubious
Namfrel vote count is only to entangle the knot of constitutionality
even further.
Perhaps worse, to brush aside pointed press reminders of analogous situations in other parts of the world is to undermine seriously
any moral basis for the U.S. campaign against Marcos.
For example, in June 1986, Reagan Administration officials declared that the United States had "conclusive evidence" of extensive
fraud in the 1984 Presidential election in Panama, including an unlawful overturning of the results of that election on orders of the Panamanian army commander, the country's current strongman, General
Manuel Noriega. Reminded by the press of the recent situation in the
Philippines in this connection, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz
justified continuing U.S. policy of support for Noriega by noting that:
(a) an official Panamanian commission had certified the election results and the United States would "try to work with the government
that emerged" (shades of the Batasang's certification of Marcos!); and,
(b) with reference to the Panamanians: "It's their election not our
election. We don't go around the world certifying elections." 25 Shultz
added that the situation in the Philippines had been different because
Filipinos had "expressed themselves" about their 1986 election "very
forcefully." From the latter statement the unwary might conclude
that "forceful expression," henceforth, would be a U.S. criterion for
political recognition and legitimacy.
To be sure, Mrs. Aquino and her advisers were mindful of the
questions surrounding the legitimacy of her assumed Presidential position. However, her attempts to assert legitimacy by means other than
another new and less tainted Presidential election have become the
target of new criticisms. Aquino promulgated "proclamation no. 5, "
an interim, so-called "Freedom Constitution" (March 25, 1986) on the
basis of "the sovereign mandate of the people." 26 This term-in light
of constitutional events-was perceived by many as more in the nature
of a rhetorical or political conceit, rather than as a well-grounded
claim in then existing public law.
The issue also raised again with additional force the question (see
below) of whether Mrs. Aquino would not be better served by formally proclaiming a "revolutionary government," instead of seeking to
maintain a basis of legitimacy in a controversial election or in the
"Miracle on EDSA" mass demonstration. In fact, the interim "Free25. The New York Times, June 24, 1986, p. A 7, col. 1.
26. Manila Bulletin, March 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl.
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dom Constitution" (article 1, section 1) provided that the President,
until the election of a new legislature under a new popularly ratified
constitution, also would "continue to exercise legislative power."
Further controversy soon arose over the proposed new permanent
Constitution drafted by a special Aquino-appointed Commission. The
provisions of this new charter were announced on October 12, 1986.
Under section 7 of this new Constitution's "Transitory Provisions,"
Aquino's term as "incumbent President" is "hereby extended to noon
of June 30, 1992Y But even such pro-Aquino political leaders as
Homobono Adaza asserted that since Aquino in effect earlier had
abolished the 1973 Constitution under which she had run, and therefore implicitly had declared a "revolutionary" regime, her present
Presidential term should end when a regular constitutional government assumed office. Hence Adaza, among others, argued that Mrs.
Aquino was required to seek a fresh Presidential mandate (assuming
she wished to do so) under the new Constitution that she had helped
to foster. 28
Juan Ponce Enrile, perhaps Aquino's sharpest critic, as well as
some respected Philippine constitutional commentators, also adopted
this point of view. Enrile in particular stressed an alleged "Catch-22"
anomaly in Mrs. Aquino's position, pointing out that she had been
sworn in as President for a six-year term under the Marcos-approved
Constitution of 1973, a document which she now in effect had repudiated.29 Meanwhile, even though she had proclaimed the interim
"Freedom" Constitution on March 25, 1986, and then endorsed the
ConCom's draft of a new Constitution, Mrs. Aquino based the legitimacy of her Presidential powers on the 1973 Constitution. To those
who asked her whether she regarded the February 2, 1987 plebiscite
on the new Constitution as being, in effect, a referendum on her own
Presidency, she invariably replied "no," adding that "when the people
voted" in the February 7, 1986 Presidential election "they knew it was
for a term of six years. They did not think the term was just for a
while. That's very, very, clear."
However, the partisan intensity aroused by the issue of Mrs.
Aquino's constitutional legitimacy is unlikely to evaporate, even after
plebiscitary approval of the new Constitution. One may be skeptical
27. New Day (Quezon City), October 13, 1986, pp. 9-13, in FBIS, October 17, 1986, p.
P45.
28. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, October 13, 1986, in FBIS, October 14,
1986, p. P14.
29. See Enrile's Manila interview with Karen Elliott House, in The Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1986, p. 36.
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about Enrile's claim that, when he and Ramos and their followers accepted Mrs. Aquino as President upon Marcos' flight, "we did this on
the assumption that they would organize a civil government in accordance with the constitution existing at the time." 30 In the face of all the
criticism, Mrs. Aquino's own unrelenting refusal ever to run for another Presidential term should give those convinced of her wide popularity some pause. Moreover, what is one to think of the view of one
of Aquino's closest advisers, her formal Local Government minister
and current cabinet member, Aquilino Pimentel, who opposed the
holding of a new Presidential election even after ratification of the new
Constitution? Holding a Presidential election after a Constitutional
ratification, Pimentel said, "would result in a fullscale bloodbath in the
country," as it would create "deep cleavages" and "exacerbate" the
"feelings of hatred" among the people, and, in any case, would hamper the country's economic recovery. 31 Great confidence in the political, let alone constitutional, legitimacy of the Aquino government
cannot be said to emanate from this assessment.

II.

NEW FACTIONS AND POLICY CONTROVERSIES

The uncertainties that Mrs. Aquino and her advisers may have
felt about the constitutional legitimacy of her position were augmented
by various political factors. For one thing, Marcos, having refused to
resign his Presidential office at the time he left the country on February 25, 1986, gave contradictory signals as to his intentions from his
Honolulu exile. 32 In subsequent months, he alternately urged support
for "the government of Madame Cory Aquino," and repeatedly declared that he still was President of the Philippines. He almost certainly encouraged the pro-Marcos demonstrations that regularly have
been held on Sunday in Manila's Rizal Park since his departure. In
mid-May 1986, Secretary Shultz publicly rebuked Marcos for "causing trouble" for the Aquino government. 33 Nevertheless, Marcos reportedly authorized and was repeatedly in telephone contact with his
former Foreign Minister and 1986 Vice Presidential running mate, Arturo Tolentino, during the latter's near-farcical two-day coup attempt
staged at the Manila Hotel on July 6, 1986.
30. Radio Veritas in Tagalog, October 2, 1986, in FBIS, October 3, 1986, p. P4.
31. Business Day, September 26, 1986, p. 14, in FBIS, September 29, 1986, p. P6.
32. There is the added complication that Marcos, when he left his Malacanan palace
on February 25, 1986, probably was under the impression he was not being flown out of the
country, but rather was being transported to his home in Ilocos Norte, Luzon. See Laxalt,
"My conversations with Ferdinand Marcos," supra note II, at p. 3.
33. The New York Times, Mary 14, 1986, p. I, col. 7.
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In some measure, Marcos' persistence, and that of his followers,
reflects not only the uncertainties of but also the contradictions in the
Aquino government's constitutional position and early reform policies. More particularly, they also relate to the new government's relationship with the political establishment of the parties, and with the
stalwarts and lesser elements of the old regime. Strictly speaking,
these areas are matters of domestic Filipino politics, and U.S. officials
have been loathe to intrude-at least too visibly. Yet, it is difficult for
the Reagan Administration to back off now from Mrs. Aquino's governing problems, having done so much to assist her predecessor's
political fall. Therefore, these problems deserve brief notice.
As indicated above, the question of proclaiming a new "revolutionary" government in order to provide a basis for the new government soon came under review. Within hours after having formed her
cabinet on February 27, 1986, Mrs. Aquino reportedly was studying
the advisability of formally declaring such a "revolutionary government." One popular Manila columnist declared exuberantly that
Aquino's "revolutionary government" was bound neither by "any
constitution nor any set of laws," and thus could "straighten out the
mess." One of Aquino's chief advisers said in mid-March that her
regime still was "under pressure" to declare itself "a revolutionary
government" so as to be able to "dismantle" the "unjust structures"
created by Marcos. 34 Aquino apparently already had chosen not to
legitimize her position on the basis of the Batasang Pambansa's role in
certifying Presidential elections under the existing 1973 Constitution.
Her legitimization on this basis could have occurred by a new certification vote of her status as President by the Batasang Pambansa.
Although shortly after Marcos fled the country, 130 KBL members of
the Batasang pledged support to Aquino that would have assured her
certification as President in a new Batasang vote she rejected such support, declaring that "I do not believe people he actually terrorized and
cheated. " 35
Mrs. Aquino may well have been repelled by the apparent political cynicism of the 130 KBP Batasang members. She probably calculated that they were motivated less by a newly found loyalty to her and
more by their interest in keeping both their positions and the existing
Batasang in operation. But there also were 61 anti-Marcos opposition
34. Benedicto David in Bulletin Today (Manila), March I, 1986, p. 6, in FBIS, March
6, 1986, p. P9, Philippine News Agency despatch, March 17, 1986, in FBIS, March 18,
1986, p. P4.
35. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, March 4, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986,
p. Pl.
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members. The net effect of Aquino's decision was to strengthen the
authority of the chief executive and to signal an apparent unwillingness to begin practicing the art of parliamentary politics. To some
observers, neither of these two positions seemed calculated to
strengthen a perception of a return to more democratic government,
however such government may have become tainted in the modern
Philippine experience. As noted, on March 25, 1986, Aquino issued
by proclamation a new interim or "Freedom" Constitution. This document, in article I section 3, effectively dissolved the Batasang
Pambansa (elected in 1984 for a six-year term), and in article II section 1, declared that "Until a legislature is convened under a new constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power." 36
All this meant, as Asia's leading news weekly put it, that the new Philippines of Aquino "now has no legislature at all: an unusual position
for a popularly based regime. •m
The interim Constitution strikes a high crusading tone. It declares that, acting on a perceived people's "mandate," the President
"shall give priority" to measures which, among others "completely reorganize the government," eradicating "unjust and oppressive structures," and "all iniquitous vestiges" of the Marcos regime. But what
that mandate amounted to in practice soon began to arouse bitter opposition, both from members within Mrs. Aquino's own cabinet and
party-based following, and from among the various constituencies of
her pro-Marcos opponents. A change from the autocratic tenor of her
predecessor's regime seemed not always easy to accomplish. For example, on June 2, 1986, a 48-member Constitutional Commissionprovided for by the new interim Constitution-began its sessions. The
"Concom" produced a new proposed permanent charter for the nation, the provisions of which were announced with Aquino's approval
on October 12, 1986. All "Concom" members, however, were appointed by Mrs. Aquino. When asked why "Concom" members could
not be popularly elected in the "post-dictatorship" era of "people
power," Aquino's new Justice Minister Neptali Gonzalez replied that
popular election of the Constitutional Commission "May not necessarily result in the election of the most qualified" persons capable of
drafting "the best constitution possible." 38 Such answers only managed to deepen the disquiet of those who were beginning to fear that
the advent of the Aquino government merely meant replacing one autocracy with another.
36. Manila Bulletin, March 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl.
37. Far Eastern Economic Review, April 3, 1986, p. 13.
38. The New York Times, March 26, 1986, p. A3, col. 3.

PHILIPPINE TANGLE AND THE

U.S.

17

Even more controversial and damaging to the democratic image
she tried to project was Aquino's policy toward local government offi~
cials. On February 26, 1986, only hours after she had assumed Presi~
dential office, Mrs. Aquino first announced that local elections,
scheduled for May that year, would be postponed. She blamed "un~
certainties and divisions" within the nation for her decision. Two days
later, just after her cabinet had been appointed, Aquino's then Minis~
ter for Local Government, Aquilino Pimentel, announced the dis~
charge of some 220 provincial governors, majors and other local
officials, even though most of these had been duly elected, and shortly
would have faced reelection. Those discharged apparently were per~
ceived as unreliable Marcos loyalists, and their Aquino~appointed
replacements, dubbed "Officers in Charge" (OIC), evidently were seen
as essential to effect the eradication of "unjust and oppressive struc~
tures" promised by the new "Freedom" Constitution.
The storm of protests and its consequences, which this decision to
appoint OICs provoked, will be considered shortly. First, however,
the new regime's decision to discharge local officials touched the nub
of Mrs. Aquino's governing problems, and, indeed, was the core of her
constitutional legitimacy, as well. During the more than two decades
that he was the Philippines' chief executive, Marcos (1) skillfully built
an effective local government machinery, oiled by affirmations of tradi~
tiona} local elite family privileges, by raw patronage power, political
and financial favors, and by the virtually feudal pattern of mutual obli~
gations, control and protection prevailing in much of the countryside,
and (2) through this machinery, was able repeatedly to have duly rati~
tied national constitutional government institutions and processes produce for him the desired results in various national referenda,
constitutional changes and elections. More than one U.S. critic of
these practices has heard a Filipino reply that his fellow countrymen
learned their lessons of vote-count trickery and "boss" politics from
their American mentors.
Neither Aquino nor Pimentel probably foresaw, however, the ex~
tent of the outburst of opposition to the OIC appointments. In town
afer town, mayors refused to surrender their offices, barricading themselves with their followers-including sympathetic local military-in
their town halls: by mid-July 1986, one foreign reporter, after visting
the Central Luzon region, reported that " in Ilocos Sur (province)
none of the mayors from the Marcos time has handed over his post to
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the officer in charge appointed by Mrs. Aquino. " 39 In Mindanao and
the Visayas, at least one pro-Marcos provincial governor and other
local officials, together with several hundred members of their "private
armies," reportedly "took to the hills" to lead a resistance and periodically kidnap foreign travellers in an obvious effort to embarrass the
Aquino government.
Also, Aquino supporters turned against her. One anti-Marcos
Batasang member, Roy Padilla, sharply criticized the dismissal of local officials and the cancellation of local elections as "showing dictatorial tendencies"; in the province of Tarlac, the provincial chairman of
the Unido party (United Nationalist Democratic Organization)-the
party under whose banner Aquino herself had run in the February 7,
1986 Presidential election-resigned "in protest against the violations
of laws by some ranking officials of the new government. " 40 In fact,
on March 5, Unido Secretary General Rene Espina, evidently with the
approval ofUnido chairman Salvador Laurel-Aquino's running mate
and currently Philippines Vice President and Foreign Minister-formally declared that Unido was "distancing itself from the Aquino government" because the latter was "committing political slaughter
among local officials." 41
Already on March 19, 1986, Aquino announced that she would
have "the final say" in the new OIC appointments, but confusion and
bitter controversy continued. Persons other than those designated in
official government announcements reportedly were presenting themselves as OICs in several towns, a number of other designated OICs
were found to be facing various legal charges, and in other instances
"turncoat" KBL followers and other allegedly "opportunistic" former
Marcos supporters suddenly appeared to have been designated as
OICs under the Unido label. 42
Although Mrs. Aquino denounced what she termed the debasement of national politics by the KBL, and though she seemed anxious
to reform the political system by eradicating party favoritism and rivalries, the President's followers in her cabinet and in the government
bureaucracies perceived the fall of Marcos as the usual "change of
39. Richard West, "Still Faithful to Ferdinand," The Spectator (London), July 12,
1986, p. 12.
40. Times Journal (Manila), March 4, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, March 6, 1986, p. P11; The
New York Times, March 1, 1986, p. 6, col. 1.
41. PNA despatch, Manila, March 5, 1986, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, p. P4.
42. The News Herald (Manila), June 11, 1986, p. 11, col. 7; The Philippine Tribune
(Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 1, col. 6; Philippines Free Press (Manila), June 14, 1986, p. 14,
col. 1.
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guard" opportunity to ensconce themselves and their allies in positions
of power. Sharp power struggles and a reportedly "mad scramble" for
local offices broke out within days of Aquino's accession between Laurel's Unido and Aquino's Laban party (Lakas Ng Bayan-"People's
Power Movement"), 43 which has been allied closely with Pimentel's
own PDP or Philippine Democratic Party). There remained also a
plethora of lesser parties, among them the pro-Aquino, left-liberal
(with a following among reform-minded young professionals and businessmen) "Union for Democracy," and the Mindanao Alliance, was
formed to lift the Southern Philippines' largest island out of its undeveloped and strife-tom state. Marcos loyalists and others disaffected
with the new Aquino regime found a new rallying point in the Partido
Nacionalista ng Philipinas (PNP), led by Bias Ople, Marcos' former
Labor Minister. During the second half of 1986, under Pimentel's direction, and despite Aquino's and Laurel's strictures, PDP-Laban
stalwarts continued to be pushed as much as possible for local government positions. The resentment this process provoked among incumbents and their own respective local clients and supporters was
aggravated further by (a) charges of allegedly left leaning political ideologies of some of the new OIC appointees, and (b) by the new OICs'
incompetence and/or lack of experience. Instances of fake OIC appointment letters, issued with the alleged connivance of former Communist party chairman Jose M. Sison, added still more fuel to the
controversy. 44
In the deepening political controversy during this period between
Enrile and his Army supporters on the one hand, and Aquino on the
other, the issue of the OIC replacements was drawn ever deeper into
the larger question of whether Mrs. Aquino could deal effectively with
the Communist problem. In mid-October 1986, Enrile submitted a
number of requested policy changes to Aquino. Among these was the
removal of "undesirable" or "unpopular" OICs, and their replacement
by local leaders more acceptable to the population, whether or not
these such leaders were or had been Marcos adherents. 45 On October
22, 1986, Aquino announced that she would institute a "purge"
among appointed OIC, as "quite a few" of them had "fallen way below our expectations. " 46 The views of her Armed Forces Commander, General Fidel Ramos, may well have been decisive for Mrs.
43. Business Day (Manila), March 3, 1986, p. 12, in FBIS, March 5, 1986, P. PIS.
44. The Manila Times, October 20, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, October 21, 1986, p. P8.
45. Business Day, October 23, 1986, p. 24, in FBIS, October 24, 1986, p. Pl.
46. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, October 22, 1986, in FBIS, October 23,
1986, p. P4.
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Aquino. Late in October 1986, Ramos, in an implicit criticism of Pimentel's policies, said that some of the newly appointed OIC had been
obstructing the coordination between military and civilian officials
who were needed to deal more effectively with the problem of the
Communist insurgency. 47
Just how far the promised OIC "purge," in fact, would be carried
out remained an open question-and a continuing source of public
controversy--during subsequent months. At the time of the November 23, 1986 reshuffle of Aquino's cabinet (which saw Enrile depart as
Defense Minister, but Pimentel remain as the President's "adviser on
national affairs" with cabinet rank), Pimentel's political objective
seemed to have been accomplished to a considerable degree. As one of
Aquino's cabinet ministers at the time of the cabinet reshuffle told the
correspondent of Asia's leading news weekly, Pimentel "already has
done the hard work in planting PDP-Laban appointees around the
country." He added that Pimentel "can now watch" his replacement
as Local Government Minister, PDP-Laban member Jaime Ferrer, a
former Elections Commission Chairman, "guard the fort." 48 All this
suggested that the Aquino regime, far from marking a break with the
corrupt practices of political manipulation of the era of Marcos and
his predecessors, very much was insuring that its own manipulative
machinery was being installed during its tenure in power-particularly
in time for the February 2, 1987 plebiscite on the new Constitution
and the subsequent Congressional elections.
Indeed, what quickly became apparent from the inter-party feuding over the OIC question and other political controversies in the
Aquino era was that, at the end of "the dictatorship" (as the Marcos
period now customarily is referred to in the Philippines), and whatever
fate the new and presumably less "unjust and oppressive structures" of
government which the Constitutional Commission and the Philippine
electorate would approve, the traditional patterns of modern Filipino
political culture would not easily be dislodged. Pessimists tended· to
see in the cacaphony of political opinion and mutual recrimination
that attended the advent of the Aquino era less the emergence of a new
era of freedom for the Philippines and more a return to the less inhibited partisan infighting and media exuberance of the pre-Marcos era.
With new national legislative elections scheduled for May 11, 1987,
there had come during the second half of 1986 an eruption of new
47. The New York Times, November 1, 1986, p. 4.
48. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18, 1986, p. 14.
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parties and factional divisions. 49 The fate of Laurel's Unido, in a
seemingly PDP-Laban-dominated government; of the old, once powerful, but now badly split Liberal Party; of the revived Enrile-oriented
Nacionalistas; and, of such newer, leftist groups as the fellow-travelling People's Party (Partido ng Bayan) led by former Communist
Party chairman Jose Sison, might have enlivened the political discussions in Manila coffeeshops. They also may have enhanced the impression of a climate of political freedom, as did the appearance of half
a dozen new dailies in and around the capital. But whether--considering the political scene in the years before Marcos-all this added up
to a national format of sustained political stability that would make
accelerated and much needed economic development possible, remained very much in doubt.
Certainly, the new February, 1987 Constitution will provide
abundant opportunity for political jousting and strife. There is, for
example, provision for a bicameral legislature with different terms of
office for its members, as well as an electoral system that, during its
first three sessions, will have representatives from different "sectors"
of society (e.g. the peasantry, women, organized labor). The electoral
system also will provide for party list appointments and for direct electoral district balloting. This complex system, though ostensibly
designed to diffuse the power of major parties, including those that are
government-led, seems likely to provide the opportunity for making
Philippine politics even more of a full time preoccupation than it was
in the past. Critics note that, of the new Constitution's 321 provisions-the most numerous of any of the country's charters-99 are
qualified by such phrases as: "as may be provided by law," or "as
Congress may provide." 50 In other words, the partisan political process of the future has yet to define much of the content and scope of
the nation's new fundamental law. This should make for a particularly lively environment in the drafting of public policy. And though
as a reaction to the political constraints and abuses of the Marcos era,
the diffusion of the electoral system under the new Constitution may
seem understandable, one wonders if all this is likely to enhance the
country's attraction to foreign investors.
Meanwhile, new opportunities for debilitating political wheeling
and dealing were opened as the Commission on Good Government of
the Aquino regime first began "sequestering" (i.e. impounding) the
properties of the Marcos family and their many close business and
49. Asiaweek, November 2,1986, p. 16.
50. Ibid., October 26, 1986, p. 26.
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political associates and, later, for various legal and/or political reasons, began releasing those properties to their original owners or
agents. At the same time, from within her own political constituency,
Mrs. Aquino was being castigated for reappointing Jose Fernandez
and Cesar Zalamea, respectively, as Governor of the Central Bank and
as Chairman of the development Bank of he Philippines, despite, as
Unido Secretary General Rene Espina put it, "their known deep involvement in the web of corruption of the Marcos regime." 51
On all of these less than promising developments in the Aquino
era the United States tried to place as good a face as possible, adopting
essentially a "let's wait till the dust settles" and a "let's think positively" kind of official attitude. Then, as in the second half of 1986,
the conflict between Mrs. Aquino and her Defense Minister Juan
Ponce Enrile deepened, and rumors of a plot to overthrow Mrs.
Aquino began flying thick and fast, the Reagan Administration's representatives repeatedly and openly reaffirmed their support for Mrs.
Aquino. Washington also reportedly brought pressure to bear on Enrile to cease his steady criticism of Mrs. Aquino.
As Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, John C. Monjo, had said to a U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on May 15, 1986, the Philippines under Mrs. Aquino
faced "several formidable political tasks." Not least among these
tasks were "working effectively with the sometimes competing political forces within her government" and "dealing constructively" with
the supporters of the former Marcos regime. But, Monjo asserted,
Aquino "enjoys broad popular support," and her accession to power
"constitutes a setback" for the Communist insurgency. Citing Secretary of State George Shultz, Monjo added that he too felt certain that
the Philippines' problems "are on the way to being solved." 52 Less
than three weeks later, however, in hearings before the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense, Richard Armitage, seemed more pessimistic. He declared, inter
alia, that the Communist rebels had grown stronger and more violent
since Mrs. Aquino's call for a cease-fire. He added that the Philippine
army continued to be "handicapped by inadequate resources. The
military situation is serious and getting worse." 53
Such contrasting assessments appeared to mirror the divisive con51. The New Philippines Daily Express (Manila), March 27, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, March
28, 1986, p. Pl2.
52. John C. Monjo, "US Assistance to the Philippines," Current Policy, no. 834 (U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., May 15, 1986), pp. 1-4.
53. The Honolulu Advertiser, June 4, 1986, p. I, col. 2.
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troversies within the Aquino regime, fed further by the sharper criticisms voiced by Enrile. A feeling that, despite good intensions, the
Aquino regime was too internally divided and too weak to establish
simultaneously effective government authority and take sustained national economic development in hand, was reflected in a persistent
lack of business confidence in the Aquino regime, both on the part of
U.S. and Filipino investors. The significance of the remark made by
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz on June 25, 1986, during a Manila visit, that he was "bullish about the Philippines," quickly was devaluated by the Philippines' own leading financial daily, Business Day.
Business Day noted that, despite such assurances by Shultz, American
foreign investors "do not share his view":
Members of the private sector recently invited to the US who
met with ranking American officials and businessmen got the
impression that American business is not ready to invest in
the Philippines. "They always asked the bottom line question: Is President Aquino up to the job?" A leading corporate figure told Business Day: "They want to see progress
first before they put in their money." 54
U.S. and other foreign investors were not the only ones to continue to entertain doubts about "the bottom line question." Filipino
business circles also seemed to be skeptical. On June 4, 1986, in an
address on the Philippine situation before the U.S. Foreign Policy Association in New York, Secretary of State Shultz had said that "We
are beginning to see the first signs that the confidence of domestic investors is firming up," that the recession begun in 1983 was "bottoming out," and that "projections are for a resumption of positive
growth" during the rest of 1986. 55 If Filipino domestic investors were
showing new signs of confidence, however, Mrs. Aquino, for one, appeared to be unaware of it. On the contrary, on July 21, 1986, she
castigated Filipino and foreign business leaders for their continuing
"wait and see attitude," charging that the support they had pledged to
her new administration "has not been forthcoming." It was noted in
fact that, since the advent of President Aquino's Administration, "a
hoped for upturn in business activity and investment has not materialized." Aquino told the business community flatly: "You complain of
uncertainty, and I am telling you that it is uncertain because you are
uncommitted," even though she claimed that the exchange rate had
54. Business Day (Quezon City), June 26, 1986, p. 28, col. I.
55. George Shultz, "Reform in the Philippines and American Interests," Current Policy, no. 842, June 4, 1986, p. 4.
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been stabilized, and inflation had been brought under control. 56
The ceaseless drumfire of debilitating charges of Emile-ranging
from his assertion that the government's peace talks with the Communist insurgents were futile and dangerous, and that Communists indeed had infiltrated the Aquino government, to a barely veiled
accusation that Aquino's regime had fallen victim to corruption, and
his demand that such ministers as Aquilino Pimentel be ousted from
the cabinet57-all aroused deep U.S. concern. Key members of the
U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Subcommitte on Asian
and Pacific Affairs warned late in October 1986 that if Emile was not
actually trying to overthrow Aquino, his criticisms and seeming defiance of government policy reportedy were "undermining the image of
stability that the Philippines needs to attract foreign investment. " 58
Earlier, on October 6, 1986, Under Secretary of State Michael H.
Armacost felt it necessary to emphasize that "high purposes" were
"beginning to demonstrate concrete and positive results," that Mrs.
Aquino had "earned a mandate from the Philippine people," and that
the Reagan Administration, along with its aid, was "actively encouraging" private "equity investment" in the Philippines. 59 Meanwhile,
U.S. Ambassador in the Philippines, Stephen Bosworth, also asserted
that the United States supported that Aquino government "completely
and unequivocally," and that he wouldn't touch with "a ten foot pole"
the question of whether the Reagan Administraiton would be equally
supportive of a government headed by Emile or Aquino's Vice President, Salvador Laurel. Laurel was another, if more restrained, critic
of Aquino during this period. 60
Yet, even after the November 23, 1986 ministerial reshuffle and
Enrile's departure from the cabinet, uneasiness over the Aquino government's future stability scarcely appeared to have dissipated, including in U.S. "equity investment" circles. For one thing, covert U.S.
intervention in the Enrile-Aquino crisis probably did Mrs. Aquino's
Presidency little good. According to a leading Manila daily, "highly
placed" Philippine military sources had disclosed that days before a
rumored coup attempt to topple Aquino on November 22, 1986, vet56. The New York Times, July 22, 1986, p. D13, col. 3.
57. See, e.g., Manila Far East Broadcasting Company Report, August 11, 1986, in
FBIS, August 12, 1986, p. P7; Business Day (Manila), September 16, 1986, p. 20, in FBIS,
September 17, 1986, p. P4; The Manila Times, October 30, 1986, pp. 1, 6.
58. The New York Times, October 28, 1986, p. 12.
59. Michael H. Armacost, "The Philippines and the United States," Current Policy,
(U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C.) n. 876, pp. 1-4.
60. Los Angeles Times, October 24, 1986, pt. 1, p. 1.
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eran U.S. diplomat Philip Habib secretly was sent by the Reagan Administration to Manila to foil the rumored plot. Ambassador
Bosworth similarly was criticized by the same Philippine circles for
"manipulating and intervening" in Philippine domestic affairs. 61 The
continued evident approbation of Aquino in leading U.S. media and
by the U.S. administration in Washington brought about a rare coalescing of the Left and the Right in nationalist Philippine reaction to
such alleged U.S. influence in Philippine affairs.
Although for the time being, restive coup-minded elements in Enrile's Defense Ministry's security force had been effectively thwarted
by Armed Forces Chief Ramos from proceeding further with plans to
replace Aquino, their grievances against the regime remained. The
chief result of the much publicized "mass" cabinet resignations on November 23 had been the removal of Enrile. To be sure, the heads of
two other ministries, natural resources and public works, who also had
been criticized by the military for their lacklustre performance, also
were replaced. But, Aquilino Pimentel and Augusto Sanchez, the cabinet's leading leftists, whose removal reportedly had been urged by top
Army generals, stayed on after Enrile left.
It was not until further pressure from the military and business
supporters that Aquino, in mid-December 1986, agreed to Sanchez'
resignation. Aquino, evidently, feared adverse reaction from more
militant labor leaders with whom Sanchez in particular had been allied. She also seemed unwilling to antagonize her liberal supporters
among whom human rights activist Pimentel was popular. Subsequent public and partisan controversy over Sanchez' replacement
again indicated the deepening Left-Right polarization in the country.
Meanwhile, the much publicized 60-day cease-fire between the
Communist insurgents and the Philippine armed forces, which went
into effect on December 10, 1986, soon was marred by mutual recriminations and reciprocal charges of continuing violent clashes and reports of killings and ambushes. The Communist strategy of entering
into cease-fire and peace talks with the Aquino government seemed to
some observers to be actuated more by tactical considerations to provide a breathing space for the NP A guerrillas and by the opportunity
for united front building of the party's mass base, rather than by an
abandonment of its program of violent revolution. 62 On December 28,
61. The Manila Times, November 26, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, November 26, 1986, p. P7.
62. See, e.g., Clayton Jones, "Filipino Left's Truce Strategy," The Christian Science
Monitor, December I, 1986, pp. I, 64. See also Justus M. van der Kroef, "Aquino and
Beyond: Philippine Communist Strategies," Internationales Asian Forum, 1986, no. 3-4,
pp. 215-234.
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1986, Armed Forces Chief Fidel Ramos declared that on the basis of
captured documents, the Communist party of the Philippines considered the cease-fire to be a means of advancing its activities in armed
united front and parliamentary struggles. He singled out the newly
formed Partido ng Bayan (People's Party) as part of these Communist
tactics. Certainly, the party's National Democratic Front (NDF)
threw itself with gusto into a propaganda campaign as its representatives appeared on TV talk shows, held frequent interviews, and even
opened an "information office" in Manila's National Press Club building, a mile from the Presidential palace.
In the discussions between representatives of the Aquino government and the NDF, meanwhile, the latter's demands-an end to U.S.
bases' rights and to "unequal" treaties with the United States, and
sweeping agrarian and other economic reforms-hardly seemed calculated to reassure the business community, domestic or foreign. Various groups within the Armed Forces, including an organization
calling itself "The Association of Young Lieutenants, Captains and
Majors of the Armed Forces of the Philippines," openly criticized the
government for its allegedly "hurriedly forcing" of a cease-fire with
the Communists, "just for the heck of attaining peace." 63 Patterns of
political violence, long endemic in the Philippines, also appeared to
engulf foreign business and technical personnel in the country. On
November 15, 1986, only two days after Aquino had returned from
discussions in Tokyo designed to draw Japanese investment interest to
the Philippines, a prominent Japanese businessman was abducted just
outside Manila; three weeks earlier two South Korean engineers working in Ilocos Norte had been kidnapped, and the Communist New
People's Army in the region in a possibly spurious letter demanded
release of prominent NP A cadres in exchange. The murder of leftist
labor leader Rolando Olalia on November 12, perhaps by a militaryconnected, "private army" death squad, was followed a week later by
the NPA's admitted killing of David Puzon, a close associate of Enrile
and a prominent political figure in Kalinga-Apayo. 64
Amidst all this violence, the impression that Aquino was and will
be unable to rally a political "Center" broad and firm enough to hold
both the Left and the Right at bay, and to sustain a national development program of some duration, was accentuated by disquieting pro63. The New Philippines Daily Express, December 4, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, December 5,
1986, p. P4.
64. See. e.g., Radyo ng Bayan, Quezon City, November 7, 1986, in FBIS, November 7,
1986, p. P13; Ibid., November 21, 1986, in FBIS, November 25, 1986, p. PIO; The Boston
Globe, November 17, 1986, p. 3.
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nouncements and policies of some of Aquino's ministers. Since
Aquino's rise to power, there has been a marked upsurge in labor unrest, including strikes, in which the government, mindful of its leftwing constituency, has been unwilling or unable to intervene. The
government's new wage order decision announced on May 1, 1986,
consolidated all workers' allowances as part of basic wages. The measure was widely criticized as severely costly to them by the influential
Employers Confederation of the Philippines (ECOP). ECOP's spokesmemo warned that the decision could lead to massive retrenchments
and layoffs, particularly in export industries. They added that
Aquino's allegedly pro-labor policies generally were viewed in the
business community as an "act of ingratitude on the part of the President," considering the support which ECOP members had given her
in her struggle against Marcos. 65 To be sure, later in 1986, the initially
inflammatory rhetoric of Aquino's then Labor Minister, Augusto
Sanchez, who in the early weeks of the new administration inveighed
against "dirty capitalists" and "exploiters" and called for a new "equitable distribution of property and profit," was toned down. Indeed, as
early as mid-August 1986, Aquino ordered the Labor Ministry to deal
"more aggressively" with strikes, particularly those motivated by
political considerations (e.g. in the Central Philippines, striking workers of one firm demanding the dismantling of U.S. bases in the country). 66 But concern that radical unions, such as thos affiliated with the
KMU or Kilusang Mayo Uno (May First Movement) labor association, continue to be infiltrated by the Communists, especially in the
Metropolitan Manila area, had grown greatly by early 1987. Already
in June 1986, former Defense Minister Enrile had warned of the "sustained infiltration of labor union ranks" by the Philippine Communists. Enrile noted that the Trade Union Bureau of the Communist
Party of the Philippines (CPP), whose insurgents continued to battle
the Philippine armed forces and Constabulary despite Aquino's repeated call and efforts for a cease-fire, had stepped up its exploitation
of labor-management conflicts. And he indicated to business groups
that he was prepared to "identify" CPP labor fronts to business management groups on a confidential basis. 67 Since Enrile's departure
from the cabinet, such revelations have ceased, and on this point alone
65. The New Philippines Sunday Express (Manila), May 4, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, May 12,
1986, p. P1l.
66. The Straits Times, August 15, 1986, p. 8.
67. The New Philippines Daily Express (Manila), June 26, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, June 30,
1986, p. P7.
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the Defense Minister's resignation may well tum out to have been a
Pyrrhic political victory for Mrs. Aquino.
Still, behind all the partisan wrangling, policy divisions, and concerns over the economic climate in the country, there is perhaps a
larger issue that is the root of the presently perceived instability. That
issue is that a number of current institutions and organizations in the
Philippines either were enabled to project their political power to a
heretofore unexpected degree during the overthrow of Marcos and its
aftermath, and/or have become directly more influential in shaping
the future course of the nation. Four such contending power structures briefly will be considered here: (1) the Roman Catholic Church
in the Philippines; (2) the Armed Forces; (3) the CPP and its 16,000man guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA); and, (4) the various armed bands, ranging from the Muslim secessionist Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to the so-called "private armies" of
political leaders. All four of these power structures impact on the future of the Aquino regime. Designing the formulas to accommodate,
neutralize, and/or harness them to national Philippine development
also is essential to the protection of U.S. security interests in the
region.

III.

THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY

The Church-With little question, the February 7, 1986 Presidential election and the fall of Marcos, were high water marks in the
politicization of Roman Catholicism in the Philippines, a Church to
which some 80 percent of the country's 56 million inhabitants belong.
The Vatican recognized this when on July 15, 1986, Pope John Paul U
issued a strongly worded warning to the Bishops of the Philippines.
The Pontiff expressed his misgivings about the Church's political activism, and cautioned the Bishops to limit their activities to "the disinterested service of the common good." 68 The Vatican's admonition
was remarkable in that it was the first time in modem history that the
Church's collective national leadership was taken to task. In the past,
such warnings from the Holy See have been addressed to individual
clergy.
During the early Marcos era, a number of bishops and younger
clergy had voiced sharp criticism of the government, and some
younger priests eventually joined the Communists' New People's
Army. During the February 7, 1986 Presidential contest, clergy decisively intervened on behalf of Aquino's cause, and indeed, Jaime Car68. The New York Times, July 16, 1986, p. AS, col. 5.
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dinal Sin played a major role in forging the Aquino-Laurel ticket at a
time when it seemed that differences between the Laban and U nido
parties would fatally split the opposition to Marcos. At least some 20
Filipino bishops led by Bishop Francisco Claver of Malaybatay, reportedly fell under the sway of "Liberation Theology." They have
urged a dynamic of class struggle in the Philippines without formal
reference to Marxism and they counsel Filipino farmers to oppose
their landlord "oppressors." "Conscientisation" has been the term
used by these clerical activitists in seeking to bring their flocks to a
militant political awareness. 69
All this, combined with the consistent exposure by various clergy,
including the Association of Religious Superiors in the Philippines, of
"salvagings" (i.e. disappearances) and other human rights violations
allegedly committed by Philippine military elements and by para-military Integrated Civilian Home Defense Force units, sharpened the antagonism between many Philippine military commanders and the
Church, leading to military countercharges of clerical "subversive'
collaboration with the Communists. These acts also sharpened antagonism between the Church and the Marcos administration. During
the 1986 Presidential election campaign, hundreds of clergy, informally or openly, propagated Aquino's cause or were alleged to have
worked with the pro-Aquino Namfrel in the vote counting. There
were many KBL charges of blatantly pro-Aquino pressure on voters
by the clergy and activists of the Church. Marcos himself, on U.S.
television, claimed that "we have pictures" showing Philippino clergy
"intimidating and coercing people." 70 (One notes in passing that,
while foreign media and election observers were quick to give credence
to accusations of voting irregularities perpetrated by pro-Marcos supporters, there was a notable lack of interest in tracking down the veracity, if any, of these KBL-Marcos accusations.) Notwithstanding
the questions that were raised about the accuracy of the Namfrel voting tabulation in the February 7 election, Cardinal Sin declared on
February 11 that he had warned Marcos to stop attacking Namfrel, or
he (Sin) would publicly denounce the President "as a liar.'m
On February 14, 1986, a week after the Presidential election, the
Phlippine Bishops Conference issued a statement which condemned
the violence and irregularities of the election, warning that if "the gov69. Ian Buruma, "The Church Militant Takes On a New Meaning," Far Eastern Economic Review, February 28, 1985, pp. 77-79.
70. Times Journal (Manila), February 16, 1981, p. I, col. 3; The New York Times,
February 15, 1986, p. I, col. 6.
71. The Straits Times (Singapore), February 12, 1986, p. 6, col. 3. Cf note 15 supra.
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ernment does not freely correct these crimes against the body politic,
then it is up to the people to speak for themselves." 72 Though the
Bishops' statement eschewed "violent" or "bloody means," it was
widely perceived as yet another pro-Aquino endorsement, and as virtually condoning in advance the largely peaceful coup d'etat against
Marcos. In the tense period between February 22 and 25, 1986, with
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and General Fidel Ramos openly
defying Marcos, parish congregations in the Metropolitan Manila area
were mobilized by sympathetic clergy. With priests and nuns dressed
in clerical garb in the front ranks, the human wall of the "Miracle at
EDSA" occurred. Meanwhile, the Catholic radio station "Veritas"
was a major factor in rallying anti-Marcos public opinion in Manila.
Since the accession of Mrs. Aquino to the Presidency on February 25, 1986, and despite the Vatican's criticism, the Church's political
influence has never been higher. This influence has begun to arouse a
strong, if still relatively muted, resentment in various political circles,
to a degree not seen in a country with little or no history of the anticlericalism familiar to most of modern Catholic Europe or Latin
America. The extent to which teachers and/or graduates of the premier Jesuit educational institution in the country, the Ateneo de Manila, have achieved political influence over the deeply devout Mrs.
Aquino has led to unfavorable press reports. Such "Ateneans," as
Ateneo President and "Concom" member Joaquin Bernas, Finance
Minister Jaime Ongpin, and Presidential Assistant Ching de Leon-Escaler, are described as constituting "a tightknit, powerful group," jocularly known as Aquino's "Council of Trent." 73
One may dismiss such pejorative reports, perhaps, or similar
obiter dicta by the media (e.g. the senior columnist Teodoro Valencia's
observation that "The only unity the priests want is unity between
church and state . . . There are enough of them in the Constitutional
Commission"). 74 But the spectacle of Cardinal Sin, during a
Thanksgiving mass on March 2 in Manila's Rizal Park, making the
"L" sign of Aquino's Laban party, and shouting "Cory! Cory!" to the
assembled crowd of Aquino partisans, must give some pause to any
observer of the present Filipino political scene. For Cardinal Sin these
days to be called by Manila's more exuberant inhabitants "the unseen
general," is not necessarily a guarantee of future political stability. 75
72.
P5-6.
73.
74.
75.

Philippines Daily Express, February 15, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, February 19, 1986, pp.
Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 5, col. 3.
Philippines Daily Express, June 5, 1986, p. 4, col. 4.
The New York Times, March 9, 1986, section 4, p. I, col. 5.
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Moreover, despite the Vatican's strictures on political activity by
Roman Catholic clergy, the Philippine Church leadership seems as
openly politicized today as ever. On November 21, 1986, for example,
the Bishops Conference of the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines formally issued a statement supporting the newly drafted Constitution. This announcement was as the proposed new Charter became
sharply controversial and came under a crossfire of attacks from such
varied quarters as the Nacionalista Party, and other supporters of Enrile, peasant organizations, constitutional lawyers, the Communist
Party of the Philippines and its allies such as the KMU labor federation, and the new Partido ng Bayan (People's Party). In their statement of support, the Bishops recognized that the new Constitution
was "objectionable to some or many people." Still, they urged electoral approval, because the document, in their view, was "consistent
with Catholic teachings." 76 Since some of the new Constitutional provisions, such as the government's power to "sequester," i.e. seize property, have been criticized as violative of the proposed new Charter's
Bill of Rights by prominent Philippine Jesuit lawyers like Joaquin
Bernas, a reputed close adviser of Mrs. Aquino and Concom member, 77 such pronouncements on the consistency between the Constitution and Church teachings only can add to the political controversy.
Church leaders' involvement in key Aquino government policies
that are likely to be dubious threatens to draw the Church too far too
into potentially disastrous outcomes of such policies. This, in turn,
inevitably would weaken the Church's potential for future leadership
in a new political crisis. An example is the Aquino government's truce
negotiation with the Communists, which some Church leaders unequivocally has been endorsed. (Indeed, Bishop Antonio Fortich is
Chairman of the National Ceasefire Commission or NCC, which
monitors alleged truce violations.) Jaime Cardinal Sin expressed his
own "strong conviction" that the December 10, 1986 government
ceasefire agreement with the Communist insurgents "can and will
hold." 78 The Cardinal spoke at a time when the truce already had
been violated half a dozen times in various armed clashes and weapons
incidents, and when concern over the Communists' tactics of consolidating their power during the truce period was mounting in military
and political circles. Even those who sympathized with the Cardinal's
exhortation that the truce was "our last chance" to avoid an eruption
76. Kyodo despatch, Manila, November 21, 1986, in FBIS, November 25, 1986, p.
P12.
77. Asiaweek, October 26, 1986, p. 26.
78. The New York Times, December 6, 1986, p. 12.
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of more bloody conflict in the future questioned whether some Philippine Church leaders were wise in believing, or pretending to believe,
that the polarization of Left and Right in the Philippines had not already gone so far that its future dynamic could be halted or safely
ignored.
By the end of the year, there were some signs that Cardinal Sin
too was beginning to feel some pangs of disappointment over the
Aquino regime's performance. In a sharply worded pastoral letter in
early December 1986, the Cardinal inveighed against persistent corruption in society, declaring that its eradication "must start from the
top: our leaders, starting with the President and her cabinet must
show themselves to be examples of integrity." Aquino apparently visited Sin to get the details of the basis of his charges, but in her defense
could only reply that it was not easy to overturn quickly the "bad
habits" acquired during her predecessor.
Church leaders, clergy of all ranks, and the laity now are in a
position similar to those commanders and their troops of the Philippine Armed Forces, with Enrile and Ramos in the lead, who successfully seized power during February 22-25, 1986. A potentially
dangerous precedent was set for both Church and Army during "the
miracle at EDSA." However, should the Church and/or the Army
feel that circumstances dictate a repeat of earlier political intervention,
will they then necessarily find themselves on the same side?
The prospect is troubling for at least two reasons. First, clerical
involvement in Philippine political affairs in recent years has not necessarily been peaceful. More than a dozen Philippine Roman Catholic
clergy joined and have fought with the Communists' New People's
Army. In September 1985, one priest who had joined the NPA, Father Nilo Valerio, was killed, along with three fellow NPA insurgents
in a shoot-out in Davao. 79 Then, too, the accession of Mrs. Aquino has
not necessarily changed the views of NPA clerics. The well-known
Reverend Conrado Balweg, onetime NP A activist, after first indicating that he was ready to make his peace with the Aquino regime, now
leads a new guerrilla resistance group, together with an ex-seminarian
named Mailed Molina. 80 The group is made up of some of Balweg's
NPA followers among the Luzon hill tribes and is called the "Cordillera People's Liberation Army." There are claims that the group has
broken with the NP A and now is dedicating itself, in militant fashion,
to the problems of the hill tribe people of Northern Luzon, including
79. Far East Broadcasting Company Report, Manila, September 5, 1985, p. P5.
80. We Forum (Quezon City), June 17-23, 1986, p. 5, in FBIS, July 2, 1986, p. P5.
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their demands for greater autonomy. Meanwhile, Balweg has been
holding "reconciliation" talks with the CPP leadership. In the author's opinion, admiration for this charismatic revolutionary among
younger Filipino clergy today remains considerable.
Second, Enrile, before and after his depature from the cabinet, as
well as his Armed Forces associates, clearly have aligned themselves
with those-including military and business elements-who are opposed either to any accommodation with the CPP, or to an abandonment of the U.S. military bases. This group also is less than
enthusiastic toward the more sweeping social reform legislation that
continues to resonate favorably in various, particularly younger, clerical segments of the Philippine Catholic Church. In short, the dynamic
of polarization at work in the present Philippine political scene is
likely to force the Church's more enthusiastic Aquino supporters into
confronting some agonizing future choices.
The Military-About 500 to 600 members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), among them five generals, joined Marcos'
running mate, Arturo Tolentino, in his brief coup attempt a the Manila Hotel on July 6, 1986. Enrile, over strident opposition of fellow
cabinet members-and after "staking his name, honor and office"saw to it that no formal disciplinary action was taken against the coup
participantsY Although in July, 1986, and again in February, 1987
all officers of the Philippine Armed Forces took a loyalty oath to the
nations new constitutions, there are few Filipinos today who believe
that the AFP now decisively has turned its back on future political
ventures.
Marcos' fall, after all, was a turning point in Philippine life, not
least because it was the first time in the Republic's national history
that a coup-like military initiative brought about a change of government. This hardly was the start of the politicization of the AFP, however. For years, Marcos had used a tayo-tayo ("crony") system to
place his favorites in key command positions. Indeed, among the reasons subsequently given by General Ramos for joining Enrile against
Marcos was that "cronyism" had become so rife in the AFP that it
was seriously undermining the military's efficiency, particularly in
confronting the Communist insurgency. 82 In November 1985, Ramos
publicly berated the AFP for laxity and unprofessional conduct, which
he said was causing needless casualties in the fight against the Com81. The Manila Chronicle, July 9, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, July 10, 1986, p. P7.
82. Asiaweek (Hongkong), March 9, 1986, p. 30, and Radio Veritas, Manila, February
22, 1986, in FBIS, February 24, 1986, p. P8.
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munist guerrillas. 83
Ramos was not alone in his criticisms: reform-minded "Young
Turks" among the AFP's field and subaltern grade officers began to
coalesce even before the 1984 Batasang election campaign as new opposition groups reached out to them and to other interest groups. A
"clean election drive campaign," called Kamalayan '86, which began
among a few officers, joined other reform-minded officers committed
to exerting quiet pressure for a variety of perceived needs, among them
retirement of "overstaying" (i.e. overage) generals, improvement in logistical support services, particularly field communications in counterinsurgency campaigns, promotions based on merit, and tighter
discipline and training procedures. Initially shunning the limelight in
order to preserve at least the appearance of the tradition of a "nonpoliticized" AFP, most of the "Young Turk" officers during 19851986 eventually affiliated with a loose coordinating body called RAM
(generally taken to mean as standing for "Reform the Armed Forces
Movement").
The advent of the Aquino era did not mean a dissolution of RAM
or its ephemeral satellites. Nor did it discourage the emergence of
other internal AFP "fraternal" cliques. On the contrary, as basic
RAM differences with Aquino's policies emerged, they seemed to encourage further "Young Turk" activity. As Aquino attempted to seek
a peaceful rapprochement with the Communists, pursuing talks with
the CPP, and the possibility of a cease-fire and even of an amnesty for
the NPA, the RAM publicly expressed doubts. In one press interview,
a RAM spokesman sharply attacked NP A leaders, charging that,
while the Communists talked about the desirability of a "power sharing" arrangement with the Aquino government, NP A guerrillas refused to lay down their arms and forego violence. RAM not only
accused the NP A of being responsible for numerous new atrocities,
but of trying to "gain strategic positioning in the rural areas." Meanwhile, other internal interest and support groups increasingly emerged
within the AFP. Some reserve officers, united in a group calling itself
"The Brothers," denied it embraced Marcos loyalists. Another interest group, dating from the early 1970s, and called "El Diablo," recently has reemerged under the name "The Guardians." The political
leanings of these and other internal groups is not known. To an extent, they appear to be "mutual-protection" societies, intent on promoting the careers of their respective members. However, one
Philippine academic who has been studying their rise observed that
83. The Straits Times, November 8, 1985, p. 9, col. 4.
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the emergence of the military cliques betokens a sense of drift and loss
of effective central leadership in the AFP. The result is a search for
new "rallying figures." 84
An ambitious Enrile seems ready to become such a rallying figure. RAM's relationship with Enrile on the basic policy question of
seeking an accommodation with the CPP-NPA is particularly noteworthy. At first, after Aquino came to power, Enrile had said that he
expected RAM to disband because "what they are asking for is being
implemented." 85 But when RAM, though generally keeping a low
profile, did not break up and, as indicated, publicly voiced concern
over government policy, there were no indications that the Defense
Minister had any intention to order its dissolution, or even that he was
uncomfortable with a politico-military action group within his own
command. Indeed, even more than RAM, Enrile, known to have opposed Aquino's granting amnesty to CPP founding chairman Jose N.
Sison, also has been persistently critical of the attempt to reach a rapprochement with the Communists, warning frequently that they are
continuing to spread their influence. At the very time that the Aquino
government was beginning its initial peace discussions with CPP-NPA
emissaries, Enrile was warning that the CPP "has successfully infiltrated various national government offices" in an attempt to
"destabilize" the Aquino administration. CPP strategy, Enrile said,
was to bore from within, by placing its agents in such strategic industries as communications, energy, transportation and banking. 86 A
month later, at the height of the Tolentino coup fiasco in the Manila
Hotel, Enrile asserted that Tolentino's actions should not distract Filipinos from the "more important problem of insurgency." Enrile emphasized that the Communists were taking advantage of the Aquino
administration's reconciliation strategy and of the "atmosphere of liberalism prevailing in the land. " 87 This was a theme that he was to
reiterate in later months, and carry into his January 1987 campaign
against the new Constitution.
The resignation of Enrile in the Cabinet change of November 23,
1986 and the concurrent reputed failure of a coup plot by pro-Enrile
officers in RAM and in the Defense Ministry's security force did not
end the problems of the politicization process in the Armed Forces.
84. Business Day (Manila), June 30, 1986, p. 20, col. 1. On the military cliques, see
especially Business Day, July 29, 1986, p. 5, in FBIS, August 7, 1986, p. P7.
85. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, March 10, 1986, in FBIS, March 11,
1986, p. P15.
86. Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 6, 1986, p. 1, col. 3.
87. The Manila Chronicle, July 9, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, July 10, 1986, p. P7.
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To be sure, the effective intervention of Ramos, and Enrile's replacement by Lt. Gen. Rafael Ileto, reaffirmed the principle of non-political
professionalism in the Armed Forces position. But RAM's stalwarts
and Enrile's supporters in the officers corps-though some have been
reassigned and "neutralized" in new staff positions-hardly are a
spent force. On December 16, 1986, metropolitan Manila's daily Business Day reported concern within the army over a reportedly clandestine intelligence group in the military, called the "Cory Information
Network" (CIN). Reportedly, CIN is to be the intelligence arm, gathering information inside the armed forces, for a clandestine "Yellow
Army." The latter is a 3,000-man, pro-Aquino protective force being
developed under the guidance of Israeli instructors. Such developments, if true, do not suggest a stable, non-political armed forces establishment. The question of just what national political format the
Armed Forces are to be fitted into remains, as does the dissatisfaction
within the officers' corps with Aquino's persistence in seeking a rapprochement with the Communists.
The latter, inevitably, is a political issue. And, as recent analyses
again have emphasized, preservation of domestic security-including
the waging of effective counter insurgency-historically has been a
major, perhaps principal, preoccupation of the Philippine military establishment. 88 Even the most professional and least politicized elements of the officers corps are alarmed over whether, in the absence of
aequate equipment, training and morale, the Philippine military establishment can discharge its major domestic security obligation. Indeed,
in early October 1986, one senior Defense Ministry official, openly expecting the collapse of peace discussions with the Communists,
warned that, given the poor state of their equipment and morale, the
Philippine Armed Forces would be incapable of winning the war
against the insurgents. 89
Hard on the heels of Enrile's departure from the cabinet, Aquino
on December 2, 1986, signed a number of Executive Orders, restoring
tax-free privileges to the members of Armed Froces at commissaries
and other benefits, and providing a greater role for reserve officers in
military selection boards. More than these gestures will be needed,
however, to reconcile the restive RAM and other dissident officers
with the Aquino regime. In early January 1987, as Aquino began
campaigning for popular ratification of the new Constitution, Enrile
took to the political hustings against her-and against the new Char88. Ibid., November 23, 1986, p. 7, in FBIS, December 5, 1986, p. PS.
89. The Manila Times, October 3, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, October 6, 1986, p. P7.
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ter-railing against the "new dictatorship" that he claimed now had
emerged in the wake of the revolution against Marcos. In this campaign, Enrile made his debut as an independent political alternative to
Aquino--and to the notion of compromise with the NPA or NDF. A
memorandum, submitted by Ramos on behalf of senior military commanders to Aquino on November 15, 1986, and containing recommendations on prosecuting the struggle against the Communists more
effectively, bears the stamp of Enrile's political perception. If nothing
else, the January 1987 campaign contesting Aquino's endorsement of
the new Constitution makes this memorandum virtually a basis for the
emerging Right's policy posture in subsequent months. In the
meantime, the hard statistics of the Philippine Communist insurgency
underscored that posture. Between February 24 and September 24,
1986, according to Philippine Armed Forces sources, "at least" 1,918
persons, including 513 civilians were killed. The remainder of the
dead were primarily Philippine military and NPA insurgents. 90
Earlier, Enrile had warned of new Communist infiltration in the
trade unions. As Defense Minister he also had attempted to protect
the military from serious charges of human rights violations now being
investigated by the Aquino government-appointed Commission on
Human Rights. He also was critical of the dismissal of hundreds of
pro-Marcos local government officials and their replacement by proAquino "Officers in Charge." While her press supporters berated all
such Enrile "defiance," and within days of her accession to the presidency urged Aquino to give her Defense Minister "another job," 91 Enrile himself missed few opportunities to wide his own constitutency.
For example, in the face of the Reverend Conrado Balweg's new leadership role among the Luzon hill tribes, Enrile announced his own
support for an "autonomous" government among the rebellious tribes
of the Cordillera mountains. 92
Another conflict between Aquino's and Enrile's perceptions and
policies also emerged quickly over the future of the U.S. military bases
and installations in the Philippines. Aquino has said that she will not
disturb the present U.S.-Filipino lease agreement and would keep her
"options open" until its 1991 expiration. The new Constitution provides, if necessary, for a plebiscite referendum on the matter. But
powerful voices were heard in the deliberations of the "Concom" and
elsewhere to make such foreign bases in the Philippines unconstitu90. Business Day, October I, 1986, p. 16, in FBIS, October 2, 1986, p. P5.
91. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, March 19, 1986, p. 4, in FBIS, March 28, 1986, p. Pl7.
92. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, May 13, 1986, in FBIS, May 13, 1986, p.
P2. Cj note 80 supra.
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tiona!. As a result, Aquino herself seemed to lean toward shutting
down all U.S. military facilities in her country. Though she frequently
reiterated that she would not foreclose her choices ("Because, who am
I to say what will happen in the next year, or two years, or three
years?"), she also declared in a July 1986 interview that she did not
believe the Philippines would face an external threat if the U.S. bases
were removed from Philippine soil. 93 Among her supporters, especially on the Left, and in Manila's volatile student and professional
circles, the U.S. bases and Phlippine dependence on the United States
generally long has been anathema.
Enrile also made his views clear. On March 30, 1986, he reportedly told visiting Japanese parliamentarians that he favored retention
of U.S. bases in the Philippines beyond 1991. 94 And by mid-June he
reiterated that "no matter how unpleasant the reality may be, whether
we like it or not, these military bases in the Philippines will be with us
far beyond this administration. " 95
Perhaps Aquino felt that, by being noncommittal on the future of
the bases and leaving the issue to national legislative decision or, if
necessary, to a plebiscite under the new Constitution, a polarization on
the issue can be avoided. Yet, precisely because of Enrile's unequivocal stand, the matter was quickly polarized, and Mrs. Aquino's own
policy has been pleasing neither to the advocates nor the opponents of
a future U.S. military presence. Certainly, key senior military commanders, in testimony before the "Concom" hearings and elsewhere,
have made it plain that they are against any provision barring foreign
bases from Philippine soil. 96
This is not to say that Enrile had all of the AFP behind him on all
issues. For example, Aquino had her own group of backers in the
officers corps, led from the beginning by Enrile's eventual successor,
General Rafael Ileto, a former Assistant AFP staff chief and Enrile's
Deputy Defense Minister. This position made it possible to watch Enrile closely. Also, by swiftly retiring some 20 allegedly "overstaying"
generals, whose terms had been extended by Marcos, Aquino found
favor among younger officers. On the other hand, a third AFP faction-that of the now quietly covert, but still pro-Marcos loyalistsincreasingly cast its lot with Enrile. It was significant that during his
93. In an interview with Clayton Jones, The Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1986,
p. !,col. I.

94. Kyodo despatch, Manila, March 31, 1986, in FBIS, March 31, 1986, p. P9.
95. PNA despatch, Manila, June 19, 1986, in FBIS, June 19, 1986, p. P7.
96. Far East Broadcasting Company newscast, Manila, July 4, 1986, in FBIS, July 9,
1986, p. P5.
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brief July 6-8 1986 coup attempt, Arturo Tolentino, after having proclaimed himself Acting President, appointed Enrile to his cabinet as
Defense Minister-an appointment the latter quickly declined.
Enrile's protection against any retribution against the pro-Marcos
military who had sided with Tolentino placed these military elements
under an "obligation of honor" to Enrile, as one dissident general put
it. It certainly further strengthened the perception among many of the
regular pro-Marcos demonstrators and activists in Manila with whom
this author talked in July 1986 and subsequent months that Enrile
essentially was on their side. It also fed speculation that Enrile knew
days in advance of the planned Tolentino coup but did nothing to stop
it, or even warn Aquino. What became abundantly apparent from Enrile's various statements and policies since his unexpected February
22, 1986 rebellion against Marcos is that the Defense Minister was
trying to develop a broad consensus of popular support, to allow him
eventually to float upward in fulfillment of his often discussed Presidential ambitions. Though he has rejected thus far formal party affiliation, he began building his own organizational political base through
the revival of the old Nacionalista party, now led by some of his allies
in the business and professional communities. 97 It is well to stress that
his ties with those communities are close. The 62-year-old Harvard
Law-educated Enrile began his career as a tax specialist and corporate
lawyer, later becoming Insurance and Customs Commissioner and
Chairman of the Philippine National Bank, before entering the National Defense Ministry in 1970.
On the other hand, though it may be the chief source of strenth
for his present political standing, the AFP also is the reef upon which
Enrile's prestige and aspirations may run aground. The Philippines'
total regular military force in its Southeast Asian environment is considered comparatively small in size (about 113,000); Malaysia, with a
population less than a third that of the Philippines, has a regular military force almost as large (110,000), while Thailand, with a population
less than that of the Philippines, maintains a much larger force (more
than 256,000). 98 Planned infusions of U.S. military assistance (e.g.
over $100 million for Fiscal Year 1986 alone) do not begin to address
the AFP's grave problems of logistical modernization and need for
improved counterinsurgency tactics. Already in mid-1985, as the
NPA was striking ever more widely, boldly, and with company-sized
97. Asiaweek (Hongkong), July 13, 1986, p. 13.
98. The Military Balance 1986-1987 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1986), pp. 162, 166, and 170.
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combat units against the AFP and "home defense" auxiliaries, Enrile
had warned that "it would take 10 years and billions of Pesos to stop
the Communist rebellion." 99
Having committed itself so unequivocally to the Aquino Presidency, the Reagan Administration undoubtedly viewed Enrile as an
embarrassment. On November 1, 1986, the U.S. press reported that
the U.S. Justice Department was "investigating" whether Enrile and
his wife illegally had diverted funds to acquire real estate holdings in
San Francisco. 100 The report was widely disseminated. To the author's knowledge, no mention was made in the U.S. media of the statement made shortly afterwards by a member of Aquino's special Good
Government Commission, charged with investigating ill-gotten wealth
by Philippine government officials, that the Commission had no evidence of any unlawful diversion of funds by Enrile. 101

IV. THE COMMUNISTS AND THE PRIVATE ARMIES
The Communists-There are two Communist Parties in the Philippines. The oldest, smallest (about 1500 formal members) and least
influential is the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), formally established on November 7, 1930. 102 Originally outlawed by Republic
Act 1700 in 1957 toward the end of the post-World War II guerrilla
insurgency in the Philippines, the PKP struck a "national unity"
agreement with Marcos, in October 1974, which, together with his
Presidential Decision (PD) 885 two years later, conferred a quasi-legal
status on the party so long as it desisted from violence or submission
to foreign "subversive" influence. After Aquino acceded to the Philippine Presidency, the PKP declared that "we did not vote for you"
because it considered Aquino to have been little different from the "International Monetary Fund-dictated program" of Marcos. 103 Though
it did not urge a boycott of the February 7, 1986 Presidential election,
the PKP made it clear that it regarded the poll as meaningless. But
PKP Secretary General Felicisimo Macapagal, in an open letter to
Aquino, also insisted that he PKP considers itself "a legal organization," and, as such, entitled to conduct its activities freely like all other
99. The Straits Times, June 22, 1985, p. 8, col. 8.
100. The San Jose Mercury News, November 1, 1986, p. 1; The New York Times, November 2, 1986, p. 5.
101. Kyodo despatch, Manila, November 4, 1986, in FBIS, November 4, 1986, p. P4.
102. On the development and objectives of Philippine Communism, see Justus M. van
der Kroef, Communism in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980).
103. As published in the Morning Star (London), May 9, 1986, p. 4, col. I.
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political parties. 104
The PKP pronouncements that periodically appear in the pages
of the Prague-based World Marxist Review are important primarily as
a potential conduit of Soviet bloc influence in the Philippines. They
are of little or no account in Aquino's policy perceptions. Moreover,
they probably have little or no impact on the Philippines generally,
unless another Philippine government seeks to commit itself to a more
"neutralist" or Moscow-oriented accommodationist policy.
Far more influential and menacing to Aquino and her successors
is the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its loose alliance
of labor, student, farmers and other front and collateral interest
groups called the National Democratic Front (NDF), and, more particularly, its guerrilla force, the New People's Army (NPA). Founded
on December 26, 1968 on Mao Zedong's seventy-fifth birthday, the
CPP's original Constitution stressed the importance of Maoist
thought. Indeed, that Constitution indicated (article 1, section 1) that,
for purposes of concise identification, the CPP would either append
"Marxist-Leninist" (ML) to its name, or add the words "Mao Tsetung's thought" parenthetically. 105 Since the second half of the 1970s,
however, and the turbulence following Mao's death and "the Gang of
Four" in China itself, the CPP has carried on a kind of "de-Maoization" of its own by emphasizing its national Philippine character in its
history, tactics and objectives.
Popular estimates put the NP A's strength as high as 20,000 members. More authoritative estimates settle at about 16,000, adding that
about a third of the country's 41,400 barangays (the country's lowest
units of government) are reported to have a CPP political organization
of some sort and that 12 percent of the barangays are considered to be
under CPP control. 106 The CPP-NPA operates in every one of the
country's 73 provinces and its power has been especially evident
among the rural populations on the island of Samar, Negros, Catanduanes and parts of Mindanao (including the city of Davao).
Voicing alarm over the advent of CPP-NPA power has been de
rigueur in recent years. On October 30, 1985, U.S. Assistant Secretary
104. Veritas (Manila), June 9-11, 1986, p. 22, col. 2.
105. For the original CPP Constitution, see The Maoist Communist Party of the Philippines, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Short Paper no. 52 (Bangkok, The Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization, 1971 ), p. 44.
106. Insurgency and Counter Insurgency in the Philippines. Prepared for the Committee
on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense
Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, 1985), p. 2.
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of Defense Richard Armitage warned the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the NPA could achieve a "strategic stalemate" with
the AFP "within three to five years"-a time period estimate that the
NPA said it had made early in 1985, but which by February 1986, the
NP A believed had been shortened in view of the expected turmoil surrounding and following the Presidential elections. 107 As was indicated
earlier, the perception among U.S. observers in 1985 appeared to grow
that, because of Marcos' political repression and corruption, the growing poverty among a burgeoning population, and the intimidating brutality and violence of NP A tactics against local government officials
and military (a brutality which some observers likened to the infamous
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia), the Communists were steadily becoming
a greater danger. 108
The rise of Aquino-though it precipitated a crisis in CPP tactics
and leadership-did not mean any reduction in the level of NP A violence. Though statistical evidence is not altogether certain, there was
an "increase in rebel activities after the February revolution" (i.e.
Marcos' fall). 109 There also were disturbing reports, based on interviews with CPP and NP A leaders, that Communist insurgent units in
various parts of the country planned to continue their armed "protracted struggle" against the government. 110 In any case, party leaders
and cadres appeared unconvinced that they could gain any advantage
from the December 10, 1986 truce and subsequent peace negotiations
with the Aquino government. The principal benefit to the CPP of the
Aquino peace overtures was purely tactical: the lull in fighting and
restraints imposed on Army counterinsurgency activity (the NPA
bands have felt little restraint) afforded the Communists a "democratic space," in their leaders' parlance, during which party power can
be consolidated in the barangays. Mounting numbers of allegations
both by the Army and the NP A that the truce has been violated by the
other side are being examined by a previously mentioned National
107. Cj The Wall Street Journal, October 31, 1985, p. 37, col. 6; Teodoro Benigno's
Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, February 7, 1986, in FBIS, February 12, 1986, p.
P26.
108. See also Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Developments in the Philippines," Current Policy
(U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.), no. 760, (October
30, 1985), pp. 1-4; Ross H. Munro, "The New Khmer Rouge," Commentary (New York),
December 1985, pp. 19-38. Cj notes 7 and 8 supra.
109. C.L. Macapagal, "Who's Really Winning the War?'' Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila), June 12, 1986, p. 22, col. 3.
110. See, e.g., in Agence France Presse despatch, Iloilo, the Philippines, March 12,
1986, in FBIS, March 12, 1986, p. PI9; Business Day, April 16, 1986, p. 23, in FBIS, April
18, 1986, p. PI9.
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Cease Fire Committee (NCC). The NCC's periodic findings-including dismissal of some Army charges that the NP A violated the trucehave heightened the antagonisms and controversy over the whole issue
of a peace negotiation process between the government and the
insurgents.
Nevertheless, some party leaders express their determination to
hold peace talks with Aquino's representatives. Others early voiced
skepticism that such discussions would bear any fruit. 111 Almost daily
the Philippine press reports on NP A ambushes or other clashes with
the AFP, or carries news items on "executions" carried out by Communist death squads, such as the following:
Communist led People's Army (NPA) liquidation units have
executed a total of 17 persons with 'blood debts' to the people in the metropolitan Cebu area and Cebu's hinterlands
this year, according to the latest issue of 'Pakigbisog' (Struggle), a Cebu based underground Communist newspaper.
The paper also reported that from last year to March this
year more than 45 counter-revolutionaries and other bad elements were meted death penalties by the NP A. 112
Meanwhile, there are other reports that NPA leaders in Panay
"are already raring to launch a propaganda campaign against the rising 'US-Cory' dictatorship," and that an NPA spokesman in Bataan
describes the Aquino government "as shaky" and likely to "crumble
any time," or that the AFP Regional Commander in the Bicol region
has disclosed documents indicating that the NP A insurgents in that
area are planning attacks on government officials and the military in
order to "stalemate" any planned CPP-Government peace talks. 113 In
the author's calculations, from Aquino's accession to power on February 25, 1986 to the middle of December 1986, at least 1000 Philippine
military and civilians died in clashes with NP A units, or at the hands
of NPA execution (so-called "Sparrow") squads. Indeed, since
Aquino, some NP A attacks have been noteworthy for their size and
careful tactical preparation. This was the case in the spectacular NP A
ambush of an AFP unit on April 18, 1986 on Oas, Albay province, in
which more than 100 NPA guerrillas participated and 22 Philippine
military were killed.
Ill. The New York Times, March 15, 1986, p. I, col. 2; The Manila Times, June 12,
1986, p. I, col. 3.
112. The News Herald (Manila), June 10, 1986, p. 3, col. 3.
113. Ang Pahayagang Malaya (Manila), June 5, 1986, p. 14, col. I; June 10, 1986, p. 10,
col. I; June II, 19o8, p. 14, col. I.
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What characterized the actual, "in the field" posture of the NP A
during the shaky truce period that started on December 10, 1986, was
the retention and even the flaunting of the weapons held by the insurgents-as if to impress on the population that the guerrillas were invulnerable. Clearly what the NPA and party have been seeking is
recognition as a de facto countergovernment, that must somehow be
accommodated in any peace settlement with the Aquino regime. Already in June 1986, the NPA insisted that the Philippine Armed
Forces withdraw from "our territories." 114 What the party has been
asking is tantamount to the surrender of the Philippine countryside to
the NPA, and the reference to "our territories," suggests an NPA concept of a Communist "liberated zone" and an existing state within a
state. Indeed, in its initial, December 23, 1986 proposal for an agenda
of peace talks with the government, the NDF sought a "transitional
coalition government" for the Philippines in which the Communists
would be represented along with other parties. The coalition concept
has been sharply rejected by Aquino, but, clearly, the CPP intends to
persist. Meanwhile, the party and the NP A intend to remain a fighting force. The NPA, CPP founding chairman Jose M. Sison, declared
as early as mid-April 1986, that he "will never surrender" to the
Aquino government, because the NP A has made so many sacrifices
that "they will not give up their arms." 115
The United States, prudently allowing for peace talks with the
CPP to reach some sort of conclusion, thus far has been reluctant to
comment on the obvious persistence of the Comunist threat-a threat
which, as we have seen, only a few months earlier had prompted official American expressions of alarm. Indeed, when U.S. Secretary of
State George Shultz visited Manila in June 1986, he was told in reportedly "blunt" terms by Enrile and Armed Forces Chief Ramos that
they had "no illusions" that government offers of peace talks would
end the Communist rebellion: "it is a possibility only if we are talking
about a miracle," Enrile told Shultz. However, the peace talk offer,
Filipino leaders felt, perhaps could bring a few of the less-avowed
Marxist insurgents "down from the hills," and, in any case, would be
considered a gesture of reconciliation. According to these Filipino
leaders, such a gesture had to be extended to the CPP in order to show
that the government had gone "the extra mile," and that the Communists would be responsible for any continuing bloodshed. 116
114. The Sunday Chronicle (Manila), June 15, 1986, p. 1, col. 2.
115. The Straits Times, April 12, 1986, p. 7, col. I.
116. The New York Times, June 26, 1986, p. A12, col. 1-4.
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The U.S. rection to all this was a curious one. Various government reconciliation programs during the Marcos years also periodically had brought insurgents "down from the hills."
But,
nevertheless, the level of fighting not only increased in the same period, but during the early 1980s, the CPP generally had come to be
perceived as more of a threat, as vide, earlier noted US expressions of
alarm. Yet, on being told during his June 1986 discussions in Manila
that new peace talks would not slacken the Communist resistance,
Shultz nevertheless felt able at that time to come out with his wellknown remark that "I am bullish about the Philippines." The basis
for this newly optimistic assessment clearly, then, was not that the
violent Communist resistance was going to end. Rather, the optimism
seems to have been based on what Shultz, after his June 1986 Manila
discussions, declared to be enhanced Philippine understanding of "the
need for political change" and for an "opening" to "democracy," as
well as an improved economic development. Shultz even drew parallels between Aquino's policies with the reforms instituted by the Duarte regime in El Salvador. 117
The Secretary seemed off the mark. The Salvadoran case demonstrates, if anything, that even with "political change" and enhanced
"democracy" the Communist threat continues to loom large, certainly
in that Central American country. And where in Southeast Asia in
the immediate decade after World War II was there a greater opportunity for "political change" and for an "opening" to "democracy" than
in the Philippines? Yet, the Communist Huk insurgency rose to its
greatest danger in those very years. How swiftly, today, economic development anticipated under Aquino will provide new stability for the
Philippines is anyone's guess. But as for "political change" since
Aquino, it, as we have seen, has been a source of considerable uncertainty and division within the new Filipino government. And it is precisely that persistent Communist issue that is polarizing perceptions of
needed "political change" and of the kind of leadership that the country requires. Having decried the inadequacies of the Marcos regime,
and in various ways having assisted in Mr. Marcos' departure, the
Reagan Administration understandably wishes to put as positive a patina on the regime of Marcos' successor. One can only hope, however,
that Shultz' remark "I am bullish about the Philippines" will not come
to haunt the United States as did the praise voiced by U.S. Vice President George Bush while attending the inauguration of the then newlyreelected President Marcos in Manila in June 1981: "We love your
117. Ibid.
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adherence to democratic processes." 118
Fortunately for Shultz and the United States-and as was the
case with the Communist Huk problem in the 1950s-Philippine
Communism is likely less to be vitiated by dubious "political change,"
or programs of economic development, and more by many persistent
structual and leadership problems within the CPP-NPA. The scattered, wholly archipelagic character of the Philippines, the difficulties
of terrain and communication, the resulting problems of establishing
closer tactical coordination and consistent ideological training and discipline among the often widely dispersed NP A units and CPP cells
long have been major and insurmountable obstacles to forging the
CPP ina an effective organizational weapon.
Divided into six "territorial commissions" (Northern Luzon,
Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, the Visayas, Mindanao and Metropolitan Manila), each with their own party command structure, and
supervised by four "national commissions" (military affairs, propaganda, united front building, and mass movement organizations), as
well as by a Politburo and Central Committee, the CPP is top-heavy
with localized and often jealous leaders. Hence, coordination among
the party's three chief tactical concerns-rural insurgency, agitation,
and united front building in the cities-has suffered. 119
An even more serious liability is an environment of opportunistic
appeal to join various armed bands ranging from ill-disciplined
paramilitary "home defense" forces and so-called "private armies" of
warlord-like rural business typcoons, landowners or political bosses, to
"liberation" fronts of Muslim secessionists seeking an independent
state in Mindanao, and anti-Communist Christian charismatic armed
cults. These bands readily draw on the abundant human jetsam of a
permanently floating underclass, rife with unemployment, banditry
and racketeering, in one of Asia's poorest nations. Much of the Communist guerrilla force consists of such elements, who easily drift from
one gang to another, dependent on available opportunity, lending little
credibility to a picture of a well-organized Communist threat. It has
been reliably estimated that, of the often reported 18,000- to 20,000man NP A force, "the true figure of trained gun-carrying fighters" may
be no more than 2,000. 120 This number is large enough to wreak some
havoc, to be sure. Moreover, the importance of the improverishment
and discontent in much of the Philippine countryside, or of the CPP's
118. Asia 1982 Yearbook (Far Eastern Economic Review, Hongkong, 1982), p. 225.
119. On CPP organization see, e.g., Manila Bulletin, December 5, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS,
December 8, 1986, p. P7.
120. The Economist (London), April 26, 1986, p. 44.
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attempts at ideological indoctrination of exploited tenants and estate
workers in village "night classes" and "people's courses" should not
be underestimated. Even so, it does appear that the CPP-NPA still is
a long way off from being able to overthrow any Filipino government,
because of the lack of total force and/or tactical training and inefficiency of its numbers.
To these organizational weaknesses of the CPP now must also be
added a serious rift in the highest leadership circles of the party, which
erupted in the aftermath of Aquino's accession to the Presidency. After 1977 and the capture by Marcos government forces of CPP founding chairman Jose Sison and some of his chief lieutenants, party
control fell mainly into the hands of Rodolfo Salas (alias "Kumander
Bilog"). Salas' tactics of organizational decentralization, coupled with
a sharp intensification of local guerrilla violence and brutal executions
of "anti-people" (i.e. Philippine officials and military), had several effects. It opened paths to prominence for local cadres, and at the same
time it imparted an aura of stepped-up, uncompromising and unrelenting CPP-NPA activity, deeply intimidating local village populations.
Finally, it impressed some foreign observers, who were little inclined
to scrutinize the organizational weaknesses of the NP A, with the
seemingly new power of Philippine Communism.
The CPP's violent new hard-line also set the stage for a leadership
rift, however. It was Salas' position to boycott the February 7 Presidential election, which the party, under his direction, called "a sham"
and a "meaningless but noisy electoral contest between local reactionaries."121 However, the surprising outpouring of sympathy for
Aquino, backed by the Church, and followed by the successful EnrileRamos coup and the "miracle at EDSA," all left other party leaders
feeling that a major and potentially revolutionary dynamic in Philippine politics had passed the party by. During April and May 1986
CPP Politburo and Central Committee meetings, it came to a crisis.
Party publications criticized the elections boycott and Salas stepped
down as party chairman (he remains in the Central Committee). A
temporary party chairman, Benito Tiamzon (variously known as "Kumander Victoriano" or "Ka"-short for Kasama or Comrade"Percy"), took over. 122
At about the same time, a senior party theoretician, Saturnino
Ocampo, former business editor of the Manila Times, and Antonio
121. Agence France Presse despatch, Manila, January 6, 1986, in FBIS, January 6,
1986, p. PIS.
122. The Sunday Times (Manila), June 8, 1986, p. I, col. 3; Ang Pahayagang Malaya
(Manila), June 7, 1986, p. I, col. 4.
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Zumel, the principal leader of the National Democratic Front (NDF),
the party's earlier named complex of labor, youth, women's and other
front groups, were authorized to enter into peace talks with Aquino.
Ocampo and Zumel appear to be the leaders of a more moderate faction that has questioned the uncompromising hardline tactics of intimidation associated with Salas. The Tiamzon appointment is
temporary, however, until the Central Committee can review it, presumably in light of any progress the party may have made in winning
concessions from the Aquino regime and in gaining influence in various institutions and social strata during the liberalized post-Marcos
political atmosphere. Meanwhile, Sison, released on March 5, 1986
from detenition over the strenouous objections of Enrile and senior
military officials, has been lecturing intensively and rebuilding his own
base on the Left, including promoting new political organizations like
the Partido ng Bayan and the "New Democratic Party".
It is necessary to stress that the Salas-Ocampo factional split has
been costly to the CPP. Toward the end of May 1986, it was reported
that some 200 NP A guerrillas had been executed by their fellow rebels
in the preceding three months alone-an estimate that may well have
turned out to be too low. On occasion, NPA executions are said to
have involved "zombies," i.e. alleged "traitors" or government infiltrators. 123 In early October 1986, the Army's regional command in
Northern Mindanao reported that the NPA had executed 600 of its
own men in a bloody purge in that region since the early months of the
year. Compounding the confusion are reports that Marcos loyalists
are funding some local NP A cadres to "destabilize" the Aquino government. 124 The CPP factionalism and infighting also have produced
uncertainty in party policy. Supposed CPP demands that Communists be included in a new coalition government, or in some of the
government commissions and boards, has deepened suspicion in many
quarters. 125 When Jose Sison declared that the NPA would not agree
to a cease-fire until specified "land reform" had been carried out in the
country, other CPP leaders, reportedly including the new dominant
Tiamzon group, declared that Sison was not authorized to speak for
the party. 126 During the negotations between the government and the
Communists following the December 10, 1986 truce, party spokesmen
123. The Economist (London), Mary 24, 1986, p. 36; PNA despatch, Manila, May 13,
1986, in FBIS, May 13, 1986, p. Pl6.
124. The News Herald (Manila), May 7, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, May 8, 1986, p. P7.
125. Asiaweek, June 22, 1986, p. 22.
126. The Manila Evening Post, May 3, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, May 8, 1986, p. P8; The
Straits Times, March 4, 1986, p. 5, col. I.
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reiterated the need for land reform and an end to U.S. bases in the
country. Meanwhile , the NPA's "general staff" accused Armed
Forces Chief Fidel Ramos of sabotaging Aquino's peace efforts by ordering a nationwide AFP offensive against the Communist
insurgents. 127
Aquino herself has been charged by various CPP quarters of following an uncertain policy. The President recently was reminded that
on December 26, 1984, along with leaders of other groups then in opposition to Marcos, she had signed an agreement pledging legalization
of the CPP, a redress of all legitimate grievances of those who had
resorted to rebellion and an amnesty and release of political detainees.
But, since the January 1986 Presidential campaign, Aquino has been
downplaying any legalization of the CPP, emphasizing instead the
cease-fire and peace talk process, and warning further that Communist
violence will be met with retribution. 128
The perception that Mrs. Aquino, by virtue of her family background and social status, belongs to the same set of traditional Filipino
oligarchies that dominated the era of Marcos and his predecessors, led
some party leaders openly to doubt her ability to change public policy.
The Philippines still were viewed as gripped by "feudalism," "fascism"
and "US imperialism." 129 Other CPP-NPA elements, like those in the
Ocampo-Zumel faction, see advantages in the liberalized Aquino era
for the party, particularly the opportunity to expand the party's reach
among different interest groups. Certainly, the party's NDF front
complex and its labor union ally the Kilusang Mayo Uno have been
able to be more active in proselytizing than in the Marcos era. This,
however, also puts the CPP "moderates," as well as Aquino, in a
quandary, as the hardline anti-Communist group around Enrile and in
the military warn against classical Communist "talking while fighting"
tactics, and stress alleged Communist infiltration in key industries and
various national government offices.
On October 30, 1986, a CPP statement formally rejected the new
Aquino-supported Constitution for the Philippines. The party described the new charter as "pro-imperialist and anti-masses," and
charged that the references in the Constitution to human rights and
social justice were mere "bourgeois-democratic" embellishments. The
party's Regional Commissions quickly followed suit in the following
127. The Straits Times, May 16, 1986, p. 7, col. 7.
128. Cf. Jose M. Sison, "Pitfalls of a Legal CPP," Ang Pahayagang Malaya, June 7,
1986, p. I, col. 4.
129. See, e.g., the interview of CPP leader "Andreas del Fiero" in The New York Times,
March 15, 1986, p. 1, col. 3.
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months. For example, the Central Luzon party organization, in early
December 1986, characterized the Constitution as designed to "legitimize the U.S. imperalist control" over the country. Meanwhile, leading pro-CPP organizations like the KMU and the People's Party
(Partido ng Bayan) attacked the Aquino cabinet's "pro-American
bias" following its November 23, 1986 reshuffle. 130 Under these conditions, to continue to sit down with Aquino's representatives in order
to achieve a truce and a political settlement of differences seemed
merely a tactic, while the party positioned itself for inevitable intensification of armed struggle.
The "Private Armies"-At the close of April 1986, Philippine
Constabulary intelligence sources estimated that there were "131 private armies still operating nationwide" in the Philippines. 131 Though
some of the leaders of these "armies" were said to have fled the country, or had been "neutralized" by security forces, the same sources
declared that most of the "armies" were still "intact and well armed,"
and that they had possession of an estimated 8, 700 firearms. To the
author, the latter is a very conservative, and probably low figure. The
total number of those involved in these "private armies" and other
armed gangs-some of a more criminal and transient variety-is hard
to gauge. Many of their members are involved only on a "part-time"
or intermittent basis. In the author's estimation, not less than 130,000
persons in the aggregate are involved.
Elsewhere, the types of these armed groups and the socio-economic circumstances that gave rise to them have been explored in
greater detail. 132 These groups deserve notice here because collectively they-like the Church, the Armed Forces and the Communists-constitute an important and largely unpredictable element in
power in contemporary Filipino politics and government. The new
February 1987 Phlippine Constitution provides that all private armies
"not recognized by duly constituted authority" should be "dismantled." The "Civilian Home Defense Force" (CHDF) would also be
subject to disbanding if found not to be "consistent" with the concept
of a "citizen armed force" provided for elsewhere in the Constitution.
In the present Philippine political economy, it seems likely, however,
that a number of private armies will find recognition "by duly consti130. Ang Pahayagang Malaya, December 5, 1986, p. I, in FBIS, December 9, 1986, p.
Pl1.
131. Philippine Daily Inqurier (Manila), April 30, 1986, p. I, col. I.
132. Cf Justus M. van der Kroef, "'Private Armies' and Extra-Judicial Violence in the
Philippines," Asian Affairs: An American Review, Winter, 1986 (forthcoming).
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tuted authority." Even if they are not "duly constituted," they or
others like them will continue to exist.
The 70,000-man "Civilian Home Defense Force" (CHDF) originally was organized in 1974 as a para-military organization under the
Philippine Constabulary in order to assist in anti-Communist and
other security operations in the rural areas. Over the years, however,
CHDF units, like a number of special, poorly supervised, AFP "task
forces," assumed an increasingly independent operational character.
They often became indistinguishable from mere dacoity, extorting and
terrorizing local village populations and abusing human rights. In addition, some local CHDF units, wearing special uniforms and never
seeming to want for weapons and other equipment, in effect became
"private armies" of wealthy, powerful estate owners and local political
leaders, many of whom were close Marcos supporters. Probably no
one, not even the top AFP staff, knows exactly how many CHDF personnel there are. At the close of July 1986, AFP chief Fidel Ramos
estimated that only 53,000 CHDF members were considered full-time,
"duly appointed," and entitled to allowances; 17,000 other CHDF
presumably were part-timers. Ramos has urged a reduction of the
CHDF to 45,000 full-time regulars, while opposing any dissolution of
the force for fear it would "surely weaken the territorial defense system." Members of Aquino's cabinet on the other hand, including one
time Local Government Minister Aquilino Pimentel Jr., repeatedly
have urged Aquino to disarm and disband the CHDF altogether and
return police authority to responsible local officials. 133 (Plans for this
are said to be ready for implementation after the Constitutional ratification plebiscite in February, 1987).
Even, if the CHDF formally were to be declared dissolved, or
even reformed, at some time in the future, most of its units would
probably remain so much a part of local security and political elite
power structures that the basic function of these CHDF units would
surface again in some other organizational form. Not surprisingly, the
CPP-NPA over and over has demanded the dissolution of the CHDF
and the "dismantling of private armies" generally as priority items in
peace discussions or discussion of a cease-fire with the Aquino government. 134 Virtually without exception, however, Philippine Constabulary and Army commanders with whom this writer discussed the
133. !did. On the use of CHDF units by landlords on Negros, for example, see also We
Forum (Quezon City), October 22-28, 1985, p. 7, col. I. On Ramos' estimates, see Business
Day (Manila), July 29, 1986, p. II, in FBIS, August I, 1986, p. P6.
134. Sunday Chronicle (Manila), June 15, 1986, p. I, col. 3; Business Day (Manila),
March 19, 1986, p. 10, in FBIS, March 25, p. Pl3.
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CHDF in the past year recognize the organization's grave problems of
discipline and operational control; yet none would be pleased to see
the CHDF dissolved completely.
In the murky, lawless atmosphere in which the CHDF, various
military "task forces" and other "private armies," or furtive armed
religious cult groups operate, the line between one organization or
cause often becomes difficult to distinguish from another, or from the
pillage and violence committed by ordinary criminal gangs. One illustration will suffice. In mid-1986, scores of inhabitants of the village of
Puso, near Bacolod City, on the island of Negros, in a petition to president Aquino said that the safety and security in their area had gravely
deteriorated. The petitioners declared that the Army's Eleventh Infantry Batallion stationed in their area first had formed an auxiliary
counterinsurgency group under the name KADRE (Kalayaan,
Demokrasya Ug Reporma-"Freedom, Democracy and Reforms"),
some of whose members had been NP A rebels who ostensibly had surrendered. It was charged, however, that KADRE members, apparently with Eleventh Batallion connivance, began masquerading as
NPA rebels, thereby exploiting the local population with greater impunity. However, another local NPA band also surrendered to the
Batallion, creating a new rival counterinsurgency group also engaged
in abuses of the hapless Puso villagers. The latter now were caught in
a crossfire between rival counterinsurgency (?) or NP A (?) bands operating with local Army connivance. 135
Meanwhile, especially on Mindanao, and emerging as a partial
reaction to the Fundamentalist Islamic resurgency in that region, several dozen, colorfully named, armed Christian charismatic bands have
appeared, formally dedicated to exterminating both the NP A and local Muslim secessionist groups, as well as warring with criminal gangs
and other local "private armies." There are some 40 such anti-communist Christian cult "armies." During the early 1980s, one of these
groups, "Rock Christ," at one time numbering some 3,000 members,
reportedly killed at least one hundred persons and was responsible for
scores of kidnappings and "disappearances" in Misamis Oriental province. Weapons and intelligence provided by a unit of the 125th Philippine Airborne Company stationed in Pagadian city in the early 1980s
is said to have helped "Rock Christ" get started. 136 Members of other
still active groups, like the so-called Tadtad (also called "Corazon Se135. Ang Pahayangang Malaya (Manila), June 8, 1986, p. 16, col. I.
136. On "Rock Christ" see, e.g., Human Rights Violations in the Philippines. An Account of Torture, "Disappearances," Extra-Judicial Executions, and Illegal Detentions (Amnesty International U.S.A., New York, 1983), pp. 18-19.
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iior" or "Heart of the Lord"), go forth "chanting pig Latin incantations and brandishing poison tipped knives" in their war against
"Communist guerrillas and other 'enemies of God.' " 137 Still other
charismatic cult armies, like the "Philippine Divine Missionaries of
Christ" (PDMC), sharply clashed with roving NPA squads in the
middle of 1986. Communist guerrilla leaders claimed that the alleged
"anti-people" activities of the PDMC and other cult armies, including
terrorism and extortion of farmers, demanded swift retribution. 138
Traditional loyalties toward a local "warlord," resentment of
Christians in their vincinity involving disputed land rights and, more
recently, the widening impact of the Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic
Fundamentalism among Muslims everywhere, all shape participation
in the "Moro National Liberation Front" (MNLF). The MNLF originally emerged in the 1960s and, although now badly fractured, is dedicated to the defense of the land, Islamic religious legal rights, social
and economic advancement, and, in varying degrees, autonomy or secession of portions of the Southern Philippines and their formation as
a new Islamic state. Muslims comprise only some 25 percent of the
whole Southern Philippine population, however, and only in two provinces, Sulu and Lanao del Sur, are they decisively in the majority. 139
At present, the term MNLF almost has a generic meaning, comprising at least three major political factions, and scores of armed rival
Muslim bands. Some of these bands are little more than private armies; "the Barracudas," for example, primarily are the bodyguard of
the deposed, pro-Marcos, former governor of Lanao del Sur province,
Ali Dimaporo, who is feuding with the Aquino government. Others,
more broadly political in orientation, consider themselves the military
cadre of a future, autonomous, "Moro Republic," in keeping with
agreements worked out in Libya during the 1970s between Marcos
and MNLF representatives, and earlier in 1987 in Jedah.
In mid-1986, AFP Chief General Fidel Ramos estimated the
strength of all MNLF units to be "about 5,300 armed regulars." But
knowledgeable former MNLF leaders note-and rightly so, in this
writer's opinion-that the size of the armed MNLF has been greatly
exaggerated, and that "just over 2,000 armed men" is a more accurate
137. Despatch by Cecil Morella, Agence France Presse, Manila, July 7, 1985, in FBIS,
July 10, 1985, p. P7.
138. Filipino Times (Manila), May 30-June 5, 1986, p. 10, col. 1; The Manila Times,
June 9, 1986, p. 3, col. 4.
139. On the origins of the MNLF, see T.J.S. George, Revolt in Mindanao. The Rise of
Islam in Philippine Politics (Oxford University Press, New York, 1980); Leila G. NOble,
"Muslim Separatism in the Philippines," Asian Survey, November, 1981, pp. 1097-1111.
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assessment of the movement's military strength. 140 As in the case of
the NPA, however, the armed core of the MNLF is augmented considerably by an unarmed satellite following motivated by political conviction, fear and opportunism. Aquino's efforts to reach a
rapprochement with the MNLF have not succeeded. On September 5,
1986 in Jolo, Aquino and MNLF leader Nur Misuari agreed to end
hostilities between government and the Bangsa Moro (Muslim Nation)
armed forces. But, on October 12, 1986, Armed Forces Chief Ramos
charged Misuari with having violated the agreement; Moro insurgents
continued to attack army patrols on Mindanao. 141 Shortly afterwards,
Misuari announced that the MNLF would not recognize the new Constitution, even though the Charter provided for the creation of "autonAn "independence
omous regions for Muslim Mindanao."
proclamation" by Misuari on behalf of a new Moro Republic on November 25, 1986 underscored the intractability of the problem of
achieving a settlement between the Philippine government and Moro
guerrilla dissidents, given the general environment of gang violence in
the region. Meanwhile rival Moro factions criticized both Aquino and
Misuari.
For the tens of thousands of underemployed or unemployed
young males in the Philippines living in one of Asia's poorer and stagnant economies, an affiliation with an armed gang-any gang-affords
status, adventure and, for as long as it lasts, a means of support. Ritualistic posturing, as in the case of the charismatic cult gangs, may be
important. But except perhaps in the cadre structure of the NP A, and
among some of the religious MNLF leadership, hard core ideology is
not the essence of all these little outlaw power structures. Rather, the
"private armies" are symptoms of the failure of the diverse and geographically scattered Filipino people to secure for themselves a
broadly accepted constitutional base of government, infused by a common adhesion to public law.
Meanwhile, there is no shortage of recruits for the "private armies," nor of new organizations to accommodate them. One illustration will suffice. Not the least of the current sources of instability of
the Aquino government and its successors is the presence not just of
loosely defined civilian "Marcos loyalists" but of AFP military, who
have been "Absent without Official Leave" (AWOL) since February
25, 1986. Claims made by Marcos from time to time, from his Hono140. The News Herald (Manila), June 9, 1986, p. 6, col. 3; Ang Pahayagang Malaya,
June II, 1986, p. 4, col. 4.
141. The Manila Chronicle, October 12, 1986, in FBIS, October 14, 1986, p. PI!.
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lulu exile, that a large segment of the AFP remains loyal to him have
been rejected as "fabricated and exaggerated" by the Defense Ministry, while Armed Forces Chief Ramos repeatedly has dismissed the
threat of any mass action or armed resistance by Marcos supporters. 142 Yet, reports persist emanating from within the military intelligence community that (1) 40,000 Philippine military abandoned their
posts after Aquino assumed office and still are "AWOL," and
(2) scores of active and retired pro-Marcos AFP officers are organizing
a "destabilizing" campaign and even an armed resistance movement,
using distant Palawan province as their initial rallying base. 143 Widely
rumored to be in the pay of the former President's followers, the participants in periodic pro-Marcos demonstrations in Manila's Rizal
Park, indeed, may constitute no threat at all to Aquino's future. But
the Philippines hardly needs the depradations of still more roaming
armed gangs, whatever their ideological or political motivation.

V.

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

A month before the February 7, 1986 Presidential election, Mrs.
Aquino, in an address before members of the country's leading business associations, outlined the principles and priorities of her economic policy. Her first concern, she said, would be to address the
interlocking problems of poverty, underemployment and unemployment. She said her government would plan to "move decisively" to
alleviate these problems, not least because she considered such movement to be integrally related to "our response" to the Communist insurgency. Further, she planned to renegotiate the terms of the
Philippines' foreign debt, then standing at $26 billion. She also declared she would "dismantle" the sugar, coconut and other monopolies (strongholds of Marcos' favorites) and stimulate investment,
"primarily" in labor intensive, rurally based, small and medium-sized
agricultural enterprises, particularly in food production for domestic
consumption. In general, she emphasized that her government would
have "higher expectations of self regulation and social responsibility
from business"-higher, presumably, than in the Marcos era. Foreign
investment would be welcome in the Philippines, but "only" if it supplemented domestic capital in those major areas where domestic capital was inadequate. 144
142. The Straits Times, April 24, 1986, p. 6, col. 3; The News Herald (Manila), June 5,
1986, p. 1, col. 4; Radio Quezon City, May 10, 1986, in FBIS, May 13, 1986, p. P6.
143. Philippine Daily Inquirer, May 20, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, May 22, 1986, p. PIO; The
Manila Evening Post, June 23, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, June 26, 1986, p. P6.
144. Business Day (Manila), January 7, 1986, p. 20, in FBIS, January 9, 1986, p. P2.
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Though hardly sufficient time has passed to render a comprehensive judgment on the implementation of Aquino's economic program,
enough has become apparent to draw some preliminary conclusions.
First, it seems well to sketch the plight of the Philippine economy. By
any measure, that economy is among Asia's sickest; certainly it is currently the least flourishing in ASEAN (the six-member Association of
Southeast Asian Nations comprising the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand).
In 1970, the Philippine annual Gross National Product (GNP)
growth rate had been 6.6 percent. By 1982 it had dropped to 2.8 percent, and in 1984 and 1985 it was a negative 5.3 percent and 3.95
percent, respectively. Philippine per capita income in 1985 was $580.
This was still higher, to be sure, than that of $560 in Indonesia-but
the Indonesian economy, despite the slump in oil prices, has not experienced the sagging GNP of its Philippine neighbor. Not only does the
Philippines suffer from one of Asia's highest inflation rates (25 percent
in 1985 and 1986), but also from sharp polarizations of income and
wealth. In an opinion of the Philippine Supreme Court, after a review
of expert economic data in a relevant judicial proceeding, Philippine
families earning monthly incomes of 2500 Pesos (about US $125) or
less, were legally poor, and some 75 percent of the country's 55 million
inhabitants were said to be in that category, according to the Court.
In another calculation, 2 percent of all Filipino households not only
have monthly incomes of 25,000 Pesos (about US $1250) or more, but
together they hold about 16.5 percent of the 52 billion Pesos Philippine national income. 145
In the Metro Manila area alone, with its 7 million population, the
official unemployment rate is about 20 percent. But other, more authoritative, estimates of Manila's unemployment go as high as 30 percent, while for the nation as a whole the unemployment rate is set at
between 15 percent and 20 percent of the labor force, with an additional 45 percent nationwide considered to be underemployed. 146
Meanwhile, the nationwide annual crude birth rate is at least 2.3 percent, one of the region's highest. The gap of opportunity between rich
and poor is widening: only 39 percent of Filipino children enrolled in
the first grade ever complete their secondary education because of
what the Philippine Ministry of Education calls the "economic cri145. Asiaweek, February 16, in 1986, p. 42; Times Journal (Manila), November 18,
1984, p. 4, in FBIS, November 20, 1984, p. P5.
146. Bulletin Today (Manila), December 16, 1985, p. 25, in FBIS, December 24, 1985,
p. P 16; Asiaweek, May 25, 1986, p. 62; Business Day (Manila), November 20, 1985, p. 2, in
FBIS, November 26, 1985, p. P23.
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sis." 147 In widely separated areas of the country, the effects of malnutrition on children are becoming apparent. Those effects in the rural
areas such as Negros and Samar-both active operational grounds of
the NPA-are well-known. But a recent study of the urban poor in
Metro Manila estimates that 26.7 percent of children in that city in the
age category from 6 months to 4 years also are malnourished (meaning
moderately or severely underweight), which compares with 20.5 percent overall of rural children in the same age group. 148
Still, a volatile urban mass keeps growing. It is estimated that
"for every 10 Metro Manilans today, at least three to four reside in
slum or squatter areas" where basic services, whether housing or
health care facilities, are absent. But all the while migration to the
capital continues from the even less promising countryside. Rural migration to Manila during the first half of the 1980s has been conservatively estimated at 150,000 people a year. By the year 2000, the
capital will have 9.5 million inhabitants. Considering how Mrs.
Aquino came to office, the "human wall" during the "miracle at
EDSA," and the long-term political implications of "people power,"
the importance of a growing impoverished mass of Metro Manilans
hardly requires elaboration. 149
Against this background, it is difficult to underestimate the force
of the expectations of the Manila poor centering around the fall of
Marcos-however unrealistic these hopes may be. One tragi-comic illustration of this came on February 26, 1986, only hours after Marcos
had fled the Philippines. Thousands of Manila's slum dwellers rushed
out to muddy, garbage-infested, worthless strips of land, including
roadsides, in northern Manila. There they staked out legally meaningless claims on small plots for home sites or cultivation. Somehow they
hoped that Aquino's coming to power and a vague election promise of
land redistribution would permit them to keep their plots. 150 The new
Aquino-endorsed Philippine Constitution of February 1987 captures
something of this mood of popular expectations. In its article on
"Family Rights," for example, it declares that "The State shall defend" a family's right to "a family living wage and income," and
"proper care and nutrition" for children. 151
147. The Straits Times, December 31, 1985, p. 6.
148. The Manila Times, June 6, 1986, p. 7, col. 8.
149. Preceding quotating and data from Philippine Dispatch (Manila), 4th week of May,
1986, p. 10, col. 1-4.
150. Michael Browning, Knight-News-Tribune despatch from Manila, February 27,
1986.
15 I. New Day (Quezon City), October 13, 1986, p. 9, in FBIS, October 17, 1986, p. P42.
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Surrounded by charges of extensive corruption, by the granting of
monopolies like those in sugar and coconut oil production, by reports
of billions of dollars siphoned off by the Marcoses and conspicuously
consumed or invested abroad-the Philippine economy is unlikely to
find a balanced assessment for some time. Moreover, the hopes of
"Juan de la Cruz" (the Filipino nickname for the man in the street)
that better economic times are ahead under Aquino are beginning to
fade.
For example, prices of basic necessities-food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, schooling and transportation costs-have not fallen and
are unlikely to do so. Even after costly strikes, wage increases do not
meet basic family needs for most Manila factory workers. Though a
modest upswing did occur later in the year, GNP growth for 1986 is
expected to be "flat." Indeed, already at the close of July 1986, the
Aquino government announced that first half year GNP had fallen a
further 3 percent from the comparable period a year ago. 152 Coincidentally, with the upsurge of anti-Marcos agitation following the assassination of former Senator Benigno Aquino (August 21, 1983) at
Manila International Airport, economic activity began to drop
sharply. Between 1983 and mid-1986 there was a nearly 13 percent
decline in overall economic activity. 153 By mid-1986, manufacturing
output and industrial employment rose modestly, but construction in
the second quarter of 1986 dropped by 60 percent compared to the
first quarter-"a blow to Manila's army of casuallaborers." 154
One reason for further diminished business confidence and the
hesitation of foreign investors apparent since 1983 is that the Aquino
government is perceived as unable to calm the labor market. During
Marcos' martial law era (1973-81), strikes were forbidden. Between
the period of the lifting of martial law and Marcos' fall, the number of
strikes or work stoppages began to grow. But since the rise of Aquino,
they accelerated even more: by the end of July 1986, for example,
there had already been 368 strikes for the year, surpassing the total
number of strikes, 371, for all of 1985. The growing political turbulence since 1983, and including the first half year of the Aquino administration, meant losses to the Philippines of some 4 million mandays. Worse, the policy pronouncements of Aquino's then Labor
Minister Augusto Sanchez were perceived by many in the business sector as inflammatory and as encouraging political labor action and
152. Manila Bulletin, June II, 1985, p. 15, col. 3; Far Eastern Economic Review, August
7, 1986, p. 56.
153. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1986, p. 54.
154. Ibid., November 6, 1986, p. 78.
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strikes by leftist trade unions like the earlier named KMU (Kilusang
Mayo Uno-May First Movement). Meanwhile, hundreds of businesses were and are closing, laying off workers. In the period from
January to May 1986, the total of new business enterprises established
(2,947) was down 6.8 percent from the year before. But the number of
new entrants into the Philippine labor market each year now is
750,000. 155 Toward the close of 1986, Aquino directed the Philippine
Labor Ministry to take a more aggressive stand in settling strikes
through mediation. The resignation of Sanchez, in mid-December
1986, led to angry criticism of and demonstrations against Aquino by
KMV and the left, but soothed the business community somewhat.
To service the Phlippines' more than $27 billion total debt now
requires about 70 percent of the country's export earnings of about $5
billion-and during the first half year of the Aquino administration
the value of the country's exports were down by 0.4 percent from the
previous year. Yet, despite all these unpromising indicators, there are
many international sources willing to provide the Aquino government's most immediate economic demands, such as meeting the $1.35
billion national budget deficit in 1986 and reorganizing the economy
for long-term stabilization and growth. Contributions, mostly loans
and credits, from the U.S. Economic Support Fund, the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank and private Japanese banks, now available to Aquino, already aggregate about $740 million, with an additional $1.7 billion in current pledges. 156 Additionally, there have been
assurances of aid from the European Economic Community, Britain
and CanadaY 7 By the end of 1986, the flexibility of the International
Monetary Fund in providing new stand-by credits and the readiness of
the Asian Development Bank and other sources to provide credits for
various capital projects, even began to raise the question of whether
the Aquino government could "digest" the funding approved. 158
A basic development problem, however, is the dissension within
the Aquino government over the course of economic policy, particularly import liberalization. The International Monetary Fund has insisted on such liberalization as a condition for new credits and debt
rescheduling. The liberalization demand requires Manila to lift re155. Asiaweek, June 29, 1986, p. 44; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 7, 1986, pp.
54-55.
156. Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 July, 1986, p. 63 and August 7, 1986, p. 56;
Asiaweek, May 25, 1986, p. 62 and June 29, 1986, p. 47.
157. Agence France Presse despatch, Hongkong, June 27, 1986, in FBIS, July 1, 1986,
p. P7.
158. Far Eastern Economic Review, November 6, 1986, p. 79.
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strictions on the imports of more than 1200 items, ranging from food
products to manufactures, some of which are produced in the Philippines. It is feared that, because of import liberalization, Philippine
domestic industries will be severely damaged. Trade and Industry
Minister Jose Concepcion and major Philippine industrial associations
have protested that the IMF demand "is a deliberate means for about
212 industrial countries of the 149 member nations of the World Bank
and IMF to make the Philippines go back to import dependence,"
even though other countries, meanwhile, are permitted to raise protectionist barriers for their own industries. 159 Remarkably, however, Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin, during a meeting of major aid donors to
the Philippines at the "Consultative Group on the Philippines," led by
the IMF in Tokyo at the close of May 1986, promised "trade liberalization" among a package of proposed Philippine reforms. Foreign
banking sources at the meeting were skeptical, because Ongpin's offers
"did not represent the agreed position of the Philippine
government." 160
Meanwhile, some top Aquino government planners, particularly
those associated with the government's National Economic and Development Authority, reportedly were in favor of seeing the Phlippines
become a "competitive free market economy," based on "hard work,
thrift and entrepreneurship." An Authority report, also published in
May, demanded rejection of the "misguided protectionist policies of
the past." The report accepted that there would be "economic
shocks" as the country developed a new industrial and commercial
base. 161 All this has not sat well with the Left. Meanwhile, the new
February 1987 Constitution, in its provision on "State Policies," requires that the state "shall develop" a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
With economic and political nationalism becoming increasingly
popular as a driving force in the Philippines' perception of itself in the
world, Aquino, by the end of July 1986, had approved a compromise
suggestion of Concepcion. This postponed until October 1986 the immediate lifting of import controls on some 160 items, and provided for
another postponement of the lifting of controls on more than 240 additional products until well beyond June 1987, when they would have
been "liberalized." Concepcion had warned that failure to postpone
would have meant failing to "listen to what our people have to say."
159. New Day (Quezon City), July 28, 1986, p. 7, in FBIS, July 29, 1986, p. P9; Xinhua
despatch, Manila, July 28, 1986, in FBIS, July 30, 1986, p. El.
160. Far Eastern Economic Review, June 19, 1986, p. 66.
161. The New York Times, July 7, 1986, p. 08, col. 2.
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Then Labor Minister Augusto Sanchez in the meantime emphasized
that import "liberalization" would worsen the unemployment situation, as domestic industries would run the risk of being "buried" by
imports. 162
The IMF apparently acquiesced in those decisions when it approved a new Philippine loan and "special drawing rights" package.
The quid pro quo was Aquino's agreement to a range of other, deep,
financial and economic reforms, ranging from restructuring of government financial institutions and tax reforms, to dismantling of sugar
and coconut production monopolies and the "privatization" of government controlled corporations. Many of these reforms have their
critics within the cabinet. The harsh reality of heavy budget deficits
persists, however. And these deficits, short of debt repudiation, can
for an indefinite time only be met through extensive foreign assistance.
The main problem is that traditional donor nations are seeking to
bring their deficits under control. A case in point involves the Phlippines and the United States. To meet its US $1.35 billion government
deficit in 1986, the Aquino government needed more than 1 billion
dollars from foreign sources. Immediate foreign commitments available, however, still left some $500 million to be met from the World
Bank, IMF and other sources. Among the other sources was the
United States, whose House of Representatives, on August 7, 1986,
voted to provide the Philippines with $350 million in aid, including an
immediate $200 million in "ready cash." The latter amount-as
Aquino's supporters put it-"could made or break" Aquino's regime.
Aquino's backers in the House originally had asked for $250 million in
"immediate" cash assistance. This was reduced by $50 million, however, after another amendment to eliminate the cash advance completely had failed. Even so, the reduced amount in immediate aid was
voted only after some acerbic debate, in which one exasperated Congressman protested: "We're asked to increase our own deficit by a
quarter billion dollars so the Philippines' deficit can be reduced by half
a billion dollars. Does that make sense to you?" 163
It apparently all does make sense to the Reagan Administration.
Though there has been some hesitation and reassessment of Aquino's
accession to power in Reagan Administration circles, Washington
clearly has taken the plunge. U.S. State Department officials have
stressed the need to "forge stronger links with the new generation of
Filipino leaders," and to assist in appropriate efforts "to restore eco162. Manila Bulletin, July 31, 1986, p. 13, in FBIS, p. PIO.
163. United Press International despatch, Washington, D.C., August 7, 1986.
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nomic prosperity to the Philippines." 164 The latter was an unfortunate
phraseology because it raised the question when-in modern timesthe Philippines ever had been prosperous. Moreover, a promise by
Washington, made on April 23, 1986, to introduce a broad new program of economic and military assistance for the Aquino government
"as an important manifestation of support by the American people in
the Philippine people as they face a difficult challenge ahead," was not
all that new after all. 165 The Marcos government also had been a major recipient of stepped up U.S. aid.
In fiscal year 1981, for example, total U.S. aid to the Philippines
was $173.2 million (more than 97 million of it in economic assistance,
the rest in military aid). In fiscal 1985-Marcos' crisis year-American assistance had grown to $264.4 million ($222.2 million in economic and $42 million in military aid). Even for the "out years," and
before the newly-approved infusions of assistance when Aquino took
office, $235.9 million had been allocated for 1986 ($181.2 in economic
and $54.5 million in military aid) and only an estimated $228.4 million
($125.7 million in economic and $102.7 million in military aid) for
1987. 166 The last figure might lead the unwary to assume that the
initial U.S. policy reaction-before the Reagan Administration's April
23, 1986 announcement-to the dramatic Filipino events was to reduce assistance to the Philippines below the 1985 level, but to enlarge
the military component in such requested aid.
The April 23, 1986 promise of more American help to Aquino as
an "important" gesture by the American to the Philippine people, only
came after a special "Lobbying" journey to Washington two weeks
earlier by Philippine Finance Minister Jaime Ongpin. 167 The latter
had minced no words in describing his country's immediate financial
crisis and its long-term development problems.
Subsequently, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz said that he,
"as a Chicago economist," could not have improved on Ongpin's assurance to the Asian Development Bank that "the principal thrust" of
the Philippine economic recovery was "to motivate the private sector"
to resume its "traditional role as the prime mover" of the Philippine
economy. 168 It has been the relationship of that private sector to for164. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, July, 1986, p. 52.
165. The New York Times, April 24, 1986, p. A4, col. 3.
166. Ibid., February 23, 1986, sec. 4, p. 1, col. 4.
167. Ibid., April 8, 1986, p. Al3, col. 1-5.
168. George P. Shultz, "Reform in the Philippines and American Interests: The U.S.
Role in Consolidating Democracy," Current Policy, (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Washington, D.C.), no. 842, June 4, 1986, p. I.
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eign investment capital and to the development assistance received
from such institutions as the World Bank, particularly during the
Marcos era, that earlier raised probing questions in various quarters
about the continuing dependent condition of the Philippine political
economy. 169 There already are critics who wonder whether Mrs.
Aquino's policies in this regard will mark a significant break from the
Marcos past. Today, the Aquino regime too is under attack from labor and Left intellectual and media circles for permitting foreign lenders to dictate the structure of the national economy, at the cost of the
small Filipino farmer and entrepreneur. The import liberalization
scheme, for example, has been branded as benefitting primarily "US
agribusiness interests" and foreign manufacture importers. 170
Yet, without important liberalization, bank restructuring and
"privatization" of government-controlled corporations, as the IMF
and some other foreign lenders insist, an operational rationalization of
the economy may well be all but impossible. And without IMF and
foreign lenders' support, the aid to keep the Aquino regime afloat will
not be forthcoming. Without such help, it also would not allow the
Aquino government to implement a massive but huge budget deficit
generating public works program-in effect a "crash employment
plan" in the countryside. 171 It also would be difficult to pay the salaries of the bloated government services, including those of the inefficient state corporations.
Mrs. Aquino and her advisers have discovered that bringing
Marcos down was not just a political act. It also brought in its wakeintended or not-the need for a major reorganization of the Philippine
economy, a process with implications and obstacles far beyond the
simple sloganizing for greater autonomy and distributive justice heard
during the Presidential campaign and embodied in the February 1987
Constitution. Reaching the major goals of Aquino's announced economic program before her accession to power, like improving the unemployment problem, promoting food production and smaller laborintensive enterprises and limiting the role of foreign capital-likely
will take a good deal longer than many of her more ardent partisans,
169. Robert B. Stauffer, "The Political Economy of Refeudalization, pp. 180-218 in
David A. Rosenberg, ed., Marcos and Martial Law in the Philippines (Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, 1979); Walden Bello, David Kinley, and Elaine Elinson, Development Debacle: The World Bank in the Philippines (Institute for Food and Development Policy, San
Francisco, 1982).
170. Alejandro Lichauco, "The Aquino Economic Plan," The Manila Times, June 9,
1986, p. 6, col. 1-4.
171. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 14, 1986, p. 104.
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particularly on the Left, care to wait. It would not be difficult to find a
scapegoat, since the Aquino regime also has committed itself, according to the February 1987 Contitution, to recognize "the indispensable
role of the private sector" and to provide "incentives to needed
investments."
As an unfair, paradoxical reality, in the meantime, there remains
the persistent problem of the sense of uncertainty and lack of commitment to the national economic development effort apparent in the
Philippine business community, something which Aquino already has
castigated. That lack of commitment, sadly, may become part of a
self-fulfilling prophecy of Aquino's political and economic future. As
one leading Filipino executive, surveying the state of the nation's economy under Aquino, has put it, "if there is no credibility there is no
confidence. If there is no confidence you can't attract investments." 172

VI.

CONCLUSION: A COMMUNITY OF U.S.-FILIPINO
STRATEGIC INTERESTS?

More than twenty years ago, at the start of the Marcos era, the
author, after assessing the Philippine public temper, noted among
many Filipinos a weary impatience, often bordering on anger, over the
persistent weight of U.S. stratgegic and economic power in their country.173 Much of that angry impatience, then as now, has tended to
focus on the U.S. military installations in the Philippines. But, beyond
that, there is the resentful realization of Philippine dependence, decade
after decade, on U.S. economic largesse.
Yet, with few countries in the world is the human relationship of
the United States so close as with the Philippines. With monotonous
regularity, year after year, Leftist nationalists, in youth groups like the
Kabataang Makabayan and in trade unions like the Kilusang Mayo
Uno (KMU), stage their demonstrations for one reason or another
before the American Embassy on Manila's Roxas Boulevard. With
equal regularity, every working day, scores of Filipinos early in the
day, start lining up before that same Embassy, seeking visas to enter
the United States. According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract there
were, as of 1980, some 501,400 Filipinos in the United States, 44.7
percent of them now naturalized U.S. citizens, leaving nearly 278,000
in some other status. (The actual number of Filipino aliens in the
United States probably is much larger.) But whatever that status, for
172. Asiaweek, February 16, 1986, p. 42.
173. Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Long, Long Hangover," Far Eastern Economic Review, July 14, 1966, pp. 70-74.
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the vast majority of the half million, ties with their land of origin remain strong. And though enduring fashion, especially among the
young, demands harsh criticism of the United States almost as a matter of lifestyle, that fashion has never lessened the appeal of the "green
card," i.e. permanent residence in America.
Predictably, the rise of Aquino has raised new questions about the
Philippine military connection with the United States. These questions typically range from the fairness of the financial quid pro quo for
Filipinos to have U.S. bases in their country, to the strategic necessity
of having them at all. By implication, they also raise questions about
the Philippines' regional security needs and foreign policy.
According to a recent analysis by a consortium of Philippine research and study groups working under the auspices of the National
Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), the United States pays
much less for the use of its Philippine bases than for such facilities
elsewhere in the world. 174 Under the present U.S.-Philippine Military
Bases Agreement, which expires in 1991, Washington provides the
Manila government with $900 million of "aid" (the Philippines insists
on calling it "rental," thereby emphasizing that it has sovereign power
over the bases) for the five-year period 1986-1991 for the use of Clark
Air Force Base in Angeles City and Subic Bay Naval Station in Olongapo. This amount, as the NDCP analysis shows, works out to $180
million a year-which compares with U.S. payment of $415 million
per annum to Spain for use of facilities there, $501 million annually to
Greece, and $938 million to Turkey. What is termed U.S. access and
"landing rights" in Egypt and Israel costs Washington per annum
$1.75 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively. After comparing all these
figures, one Manila columnist wrote that "Whether 'rent' or 'assistance,' we have been getting the short end of the stick from Washington
for many years now . . . next time we talk, let's go for the brass
ring. ,17s
Looking at the amount of "rental" payment or "aid" alone is
hardly an adequate index of the contribution which the presence of the
U.S. bases makes to the Philippine economy. Not in Egypt, Israel, or
Turkey, for example, are employment opportunities provided for
thousands of local workers, as is the case at the U.S. installations in
the Philippines. Nor are there comparable injections of spending into
local economies made by U.S. service personnel and their dependents.
Still, the "rental" comparisons linger in the public mind, feeding the
174. Midday (Manila), June 6, 181, p. I, col. I.
175. Ibid., p. 6, col. 2.
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sense of aggrieved dependence and resentment over perceived exploitation that has run for decades through the U.S.-Philippine relationship.
In the discussions and decisions of the "Concom" in July and August
1986, that sense of aggrievement was particularly evident.
At present, few authoritative observers doubt that, after 1991, the
U.S. military presence in the Philippines will continue. But it will
come only after a burst of nationalist rhetoric in the new Philippine
Congress, and perhaps after a national plebiscite, and only at the cost
to Washington of a substantially higher "rental," as well as further
assertions of Philippine sovereign and operational control. No Filippine politician will be able to afford to ignore a considerably increased
Filipino public sensitivity to the bases issue, along with a broadened
awareness of the importance of the bases to the United States. That
greater sensitivity and awareness are themselves a legacy of the fall of
Marcos and the rise of Aquino. These, it may be recalled, prompted
worried Pentagon estimates of the heavy cost to the United States of
having to relocate the Clark and Subic facilities if that became
necessary.
The NDCP analysis, moreover, also contains a section, well publicized in the Philippine media, on the eleven U.S. military facilities in
the Philippines, other than Subic and Clark. Virtually all of these
eleven are highly sophisticated and needed communications stations,
maintaining intelligence flow or surveillance at a time of a growing
Soviet military presence in the Philippine strategic environment. Because of Aquino and the much amplified voice she has given to one
dimension of the public temper that is more openly and sharply critical of the persisting U.S. presence in the country, the periodic "battle
of the bases" fought in Philippine politics is likely to be more intense
in the future.
But are the U.S. bases in the Philippines necessary at all-particularly to the Philippines? To some observers, the liability of the bases
outweighs any advantages, since they are seen as so many "magnets to
attack." That view, inter alia, is heard among some contributors to
the NDCP report. Mrs. Aquino's view that the Philippines would not
face an external threat if the American bases were removed also strikes
a responsive chord in these quarters. As the debate over the future of
the bases grew in the middle of 1986, the U.S. Embassy in Manila
incautiously entered the fray, issuing a pamphlet rebutting recent Filipino critics of the bases' pressence. This merely provoked a further
attack, this time from several professors of the University of the Philippines. These professors declared that the very size and sophistication of the U.S. bases made it "likely that five megaton bombs will be
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dropped on them." 176
Meanwhile, U.S. spokesmen, from President Ronald Reagan on
down, have stressed that "one cannot minimize the importance of
those bases," and that the bases are essential to support the "wideranging [U.S.] commitments all along the Asian littoral," as Assistant
State Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Gaston Sigur, put
it. 177 In December 1986, the commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet even
declared that if the United States lost its naval and air bases in the
Philippines, it "would be turning over our friends and allies to Soviet
political and military domination in the region." Indeed, according to
this view, there are no good "alternatives" to the Philippine bases,
which remain essential if the United States intends to remain "a Westem Pacific power." 178 In the Philippines, as we have seen, a principal
adovcate of this position has been former National Defense Secretary
Juan Ponce Enrile, who repeatedly has warned that the continued
presence of the U.S. bases is necessary because their removal "will
create a vacuum in this part of the world." 179
In this context, the debate over the increased public interest since
Aquino's rise to power in the bases issue has also provided greater
impetus to a discussion of the Philippines' whole future relationship
with other superpowers. What also is emerging as part of the debate
over the bases is more attention to the possibility of a "neutral," genuinely non-aligned, and "inoffensive" Philippines, a country which
would not be a danger and, therefore, a friend to all the superpowers
and the regional states. The old Cold War alignments, from this point
of view, are perceived as obsolete. In this perception, too, both
Gorbachev's USSR and Deng Xiaopeng's China are considered as
much more interested in pragmatic solutions to their development
problems than to ideologically highly charged expansionist ambitions.
Alejandro Melchor, the Philippines' new ambassador to the Soviet Union, reportedly views superpower relations from this angle.
Other Aquino cabinet officials, like the Trade and Industry Minister
Jose Concepcion, are particularly interested in mitigating the Philippines' one-sided financial and commercial dependence on the West
and Japan, and are anxious to broaden Filipino-Soviet trade relations
(which had a total value of only $44 million in 1985). Mrs. Aquino
176. New Day, August 4, 1986, p. 6, in FBIS, August 5, 1986, p. P2.
177. The Straits Times, Februray 21, 1986, p. 14, and Gaston J. Sigur, "US Security
Interests in the Philippines" Current Policy (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Washington, D.C.), no. 815, April 10, 1985, p. l.
178. The New York Times, December 11, 1986, p. A18, col. I.
179. Manila Bulletin, July 23, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, July 24, 1986, p. P4.
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supporters also recall that her slain husband, Benigno, essentially
shared this "the Cold War is obsolete" philosophy. Benigno Aquino
made several visits to the USSR, and in a book on his travels there,
entitled Journey to Moscow, he urged his countrymen to abandon their
negative Cold War preoccupations. 180
However, to note the emergence under Aquino of a still stronger
anti-U.S. bases sentiment and a more avowed "neutralist" current in
Filipino opinion, is not to say that Philippine foreign policy is about to
undergo a fundamental change. Nor is it to say that Philippine strategic relationships with the United States are on the verge of collapse.
Despite some audible anti-bases and "neutralist" sentiments, the Philippines continues in the same ambivalent strategic position as that of
her fellow members of ASEAN. Though formally committed under
their 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration to the establishment of
ZOPFAN (a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), all ASEAN
members also maintain arrangements for regular joint military exercises and formal collective security arrangements with major Western
powers, such as the United States with Thailand; Malaysia, Singapore
and Brunei with the United Kingdom and Australia. ASEAN members also maintain regular mutual consultations on defense matters. 181
Thus far, in the budding debate over future Filipino "neutrality"
and over a more evenhanded Filipino relationship with all the superpowers, no one has raised the issue of the continuance of the 1952 USPhilippine Mutual Defense Treaty, nor of the 1954 Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty (usually known as the Manila Pact). Despite the formal dissolution of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), the operational arm of the Manila Pact in 1977, the provisions
of the Pact itself remain in force. Under the 1952 Mutual Defense
Treaty, which is of indefinite duration, the United States and the Philippines recognize (article 4) that an armed attack in the Pacific area on
either of the parties would be a threat to the peace, requiring action to
meet the "common danger." The Manila Pact essentially repeats this
phraseology (article 4, subclause 1), and moreover demands (article 4,
subclause 2) that defensive action be taken even if the sovereignty or
"political independence" of the contracting parties "is threatened in
any way other than by armed attack." 182 The last formulation is espe180. Asiaweek, August 10, 1986, p. 14.
181. On ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration

and its implications see, e.g., Dick WilThe Neutralization of Southeast Asia (Praeger, New York, 1975).
182. Legislation on Foreign Relations with Explanatory Notes. Committee on Foreign
Affairs, US. House of Representatives and Commitee on Foreign Relations, US. Senate
son,

(U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., March,
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cially significant, because it can be interpreted as a required response
to a threat of domestic political or guerrilla subversion.
As the NDCP analysis notes, the current U.S.-Philippine Mutual
Bases Agreement provides that "operational use" of the U.S. military
installations in the Philippines today, including for the purpose of
"military combat operations", falls within the 1953 U.S.-Philippine
Mutual Defense Treaty and the 1954 Manila Pact. Operations to be
conducted "other than" those in the context of these two treaties, for
example, the emplacement by the United States of long range missiles
in the bases, shall be the subject of prior consultation between the two
governments. Notwithstanding this, a 1979 amendment to the bases
agreement assured the United States of "unhampered" use of its military forces in the Philippines. 183
In other words, the raison d'etre of the bases is specifically linked
to two key strategic agreements of the Phlippine government, now
more than a generation old. Should the movement toward elimination
of the U.S. bases gain still further momentum in the Philippines, it
seems probable that both U.S. and Philippine quarters will call inerased attention to the linkage of the bases to the 1952 and 1954 defense treaties. Meanwhile, from the point of living with an anomalyi.e. voicing a desire for national or regional neutrality while maintaining regular and close military support or security treaty arrangements
with major powers outside the region-the Philippines hardly are
unique among ASEAN members.
Despite the Reagan Administration's obvious campaign from the
middle of 1986 or so onward to charm Mrs. Aquino and stress Washington's commitment to and positive expectations from her regime, it
likely will be less America's own strategic needs and more Philippine
security interests that ultimately will allow for the continued presence
of U.S. bases beyond 1991. Toward making such a decision, Aquino
has given a stronger voice and more intellectual depth to the argument
of a more "neutral" or truly non-aligned Philippines. U.S. Secretary
of the Navy John Lehman might warn, as he did on AprillO, 1986, in
testimony before a Senate Subcommitee on Seapower that "there are
no substitutes" to Subic and Clark bases and that, therefore, it is critical for the United States to retain control of these installations. 184
Lehman's--or any other U.S. official's--concern is likely to be less
decisive for Filipinos than Mrs. Aquino's confident perception (i.e.,
183. Midday (Manila), June 6, 1986, p. 6, col. 3-4.
184. Associated Press despatch, Washington, D.C., April 10, 1986.
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that her country would face no external threat if the United States
bases were not renewed) that renewal of U.S. rights simply is too risky.
A major factor in the Philippine risk assessment is the reality of a
steady projection of Soviet military power in the South China Sea area
and the Pacific. In the past three years, the Soviet naval presence in
Pacific waters has nearly doubled. The USSR today has 410 vessels in
these waters, among them 115 submarines (of which 30 carry nuclear
missiles) and two Kiev-class aircraft carriers. Directly across the
South China Sea from the Philippines, at Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay
station, the USSR now regularly maintains up to 25 naval vessels. Soviet aircraft permanently stationed in Vietnam include a squadron of
advanced MiG-23 fighter aircraft. Some 7,000 Soviet military are now
based in Vietnam alone, and the Cambodian port of Kompong Som
clearly is being secured to accommodate a regular Soviet military presence. At the same time, the USSR is reaching out across the Eastern
Pacific, seeking port facilities or fishing and exploratory rights and offering the assistance of its technicians to such smaller island nations as
Kiribati and Vanuatu. If the Soviets' Pacific activity continues, as
seems probable, then by 1991 the U.S. Air Force's 9,400 personnel and
F-4E fighter squadrons and tactical airlift wing at Clark base, and the
5,300 U.S. sailors, carriers, submarines and other nearby U.S. Seventh
Fleet vessels at Subic, would seem a good deal more comforting to
doubtful Filipinos. 185
Those in the Philippines who would pin their hopes on a mutual
U.S.-Soviet force reduction in the Pacific area also will have to contend with the strategic consequences of one of Southeast Asia's more
intractably unresolved problems, i.e. the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia and the Cambodian, ASEAN, U.S. and Chinese resistance to
that presence. I will not review the tortuous course of the Cambodian
political, military and diplomatic conflict. However, at the close of
1978, the Vietnamese invaded their Cambodian neighbor in force and
continue to maintain some 160,000 troops, despite the cost of regular
international condemnation and isolation from development opportunities. Suffice it to say that for various reasons none of the three superpowers perceives any urgent need for compromise in the Cambodian
problem. 186
Although year after year, numerous proposed solutions to the
185. The Military Balance 1985-1986 (The International Institute for Strategic Studies,
London, 1985), pp. 24, 30; The New York Times, August 10, 1986, p. E3. See also Alvin H.
Bernstein, "The Soviets in Cam Ranh Bay," The National Interest (Washington, D.C.)
(Spring 1986), pp. 17-29.
186. For an elaboration on these points, see Justus M. van der Kroef, Dynamics of the
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Cambodian problem whirl about the diplomatic circuit, Vietnam's dependence on the USSR for economic and military assistance (now running an estimated $2.5 billion per annum) continues apace - as does
the Soviet quid pro quo in using Vietnamese military installations at
Danang, Cam Ranh Bay and elsewhere. The Soviet presence in Vietnam adds to the arsenal of arguments of those pointing to the necessity
of maintaining U.S. bases in the Philippines.
Soviet media, to be sure, cite with approval occasional Philippine
press comment that the "vacuum theory is a colonialist weapon." 187
This is a reference to the above cited argument that the withdrawal of
the United States from Clark and Subic bases would create a dangerous "vacuum". The Soviets also contend that the vacuum theory is
"totally at variance with the policy of the USSR," which, it is said,
calls for mutual reductions in armed activity and political tensions in
the region. 188 Along these lines, on July 28, 1986, in a wide-ranging
statement in Vladivostok dealing with Soviet interest in and commitment to a settlement of various unresolved disputes in the Far East,
the Soviet party's Secretary General, Mikhail Gorbachev, declared almost in passing that "In general, I'd like to say that if the U.S. were to
give up its military presence, say in the Philippines, we wouldn't leave
that step unanswered." 189 What Gorbachev had in mind with this
vague offer of a quid pro quo is speculation at best. In the Aquino
government, not even the severest critic of the continuance of U.S.
bases believes that Gorbachev's statement "in general" signals an important new Soviet peace overture.
In this connection, the People's Republic of China is also a player
in the Cambodian game and, therefore, in the base problem. The
United States could reduce its Philippine or Western Pacific military
presence. And yet Beijing, implacably opposed to Vietnam's military
presence in and political dominance of Cambodia today, would remain
a threat to Hanoi - and thus justify Vietnam's continued desire for a
Soviet military support presence. The Chinese threat is not an idle
one: in 1979 China briefly invaded and occupied a strip of territory in
North Vietnam as a "punitive lesson" to Hanoi for its invasion of
Cambodia and alleged maltreatment of Chinese residents. Since then,
Beijing's spokesmen have warned Hanoi from time to time of the posCambodian Conflict (The Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1986), Conflict Studies no. 183.
187. Izvestiya (Moscow), August 8, 1986, p. 4, morning edition, in FBIS, August 11,
1986, p. El.
188. Ibid.
189. Asiaweek, August 10, 1986, p. 14.
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sibility of a "second punitive lesson." Chinese-Vietnamese military
clashes at their common border have been frequent over the years. In
short, Philippine security concerns are not just linked to the present
commitment of U.S.-Soviet power in the Pacific, but also to a SinoVietnamese compromise in Cambodia with which that power commitment is inextricably linked.
Thus far, the Aquino government, like the Marcos regime before
it, has shown little interest and taken little initiative in bringing the
stalemated Cambodian question to a close. Indeed, official Philippine
pronouncements on the matter since 1979 have been fewer than that of
any other ASEAN member. What Philippine statements there are on
the issue also show little of the probing concern for a diplomatic solution, or even a reaction to the danger of the problem, characteristic of
Indonesia, Thai or Singapore statements. The Philippine position,
thus far, essentially has been to tag along with the policy proposals of
other ASEAN members. This is surprising. For though one may applaud the increased public discussion since the rise of Aquino of the
future of U.S. bases in the Philippines, such a debate is unlikely to
yield much of a consensus until the triangle of superpower interests
around Indochina and the South China Sea is more fully understood.
In the meantime, the dominant U.S. role in the IMF-World
Bank, and its influence in international money markets, generally give
Washington powerful assets with which to continue to define the Philippine national security agenda. Short of a revolutionary break with
the United States and all that it entails, neither Aquino nor her successor regimes seem in a position to alter that agenda.
Noting this, I emphasize that the real danger to future U.S. strategic interests in the country may well come from the Filipino perception that Washington is a meddler, if not a provocateur, in the political
polarization process now taking place in the Philippines. Reports that
it was the United States that has brought pressure to bear to seek the
removal of such allegedly "left leaning" Aquino cabinet members as
Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo and Labor Minister Augusto
Sanchez feeds such a perception. 190 But indirectly, the founding (or
perhaps one should say: re-founding) in mid-August 1986 of the new
Nacionalista Party as a vehicle for Enrile and the Right, and of the
new "People's Party" (Partido ng Bayan), led by Jose Sison, also feeds
such a perception.
Meanwhile, the steady bolstering of Aquino's position, including
190. The New Philippines Daily Express, August 12, 1986, p. 1, in FBIS, August 13,
1986, p. P8.
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by editorial policies of the U.S. media, has not necessarily improved
the image of the United States. To be sure, on February 2, 1987
Aquino won an impressive 77% of the electorate's vote in support of
her personally endorsed new Constitution. The vote was seen as an
endorsement of Aquino's own Presidential legitimacy as well. Critics
noted that after carefully replacing the local bureaucracy with her own
official appointees, the outcome of the February 2 poll was assuredgiven past patterns of electoral compliance. More pointed was the failure of the Aquino regime to do any better in reaching a rapprochement with the NPA insurgents than Marcos. On January 30, 1987
CPP spokesmen finally announced that they would not continue the
60-day truce with the AFP after its February 8, 1987 deadline. Within
days after the expiration date it came to sharply stepped up fighting.
This time a Philippine President faces a Communist resurgence with
and AFP critical, if not hostile, toward the Chief Executive's position
and policies: not a source of comfort for the US. The end of Marcos
likely will increase rather than lessen the turbulence of American-Filipino relations.
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